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9th International Conference on Asian Studies 2021

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Summary of the Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Asian Studies 2021

14-10-2021- Online Conference

The 9th International Conference on Asian Studies 2021 organised by ICRD, Sri Lanka was held on 14-10-2021 in Singapore time. At the outset, the Convenor of the Conference, Dr. Prabhath Patabendi welcomed the scholars and spoke about the theme of the Conference. Following this, three keynote addresses were rendered, one by Dr. Sadequl Islam Professor of Economics, Laurentian University, Canada who spoke on *"Reflections on the Healthcare system and Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons from Selected Asian countries"* and Dr. Charles Allen Brown, Continuing Lecturer, Purdue Language and Cultural Exchange Program, Purdue University, Indiana, U S A. Dr. Brown spoke about *"Can we Keep English Language Education from Promoting Social Injustice? A 21st Century Challenge for Asia"*. The third keynote speech was rendered by Dr. John Walsh, Associate Dean and Director, English Language Programs, International College, Krirk University, Thailand and he spoke about *"Government-Business Relationships in East Asia in the Post-Pandemic Era?"*

The Conference was attended by 41 delegates from 25 countries. There were thought provoking papers on various themes. We had quite a few papers on the sociopolitical status for example, the mutual understanding between western liberal democracies and the people's republic of China, Political warfare and propaganda and disinformation on Papuan conflict by Non-State actors against Indonesia and The Ombudsman system of Thailand and its roles in Thai politics.

In the Conference there was a paper on Insurtech: Challenges and Opportunities for Insurance industry in Vietnam. Several new ideas came to the fore during the Conference, like the Strategy of Eradicating Bribery and how effective International Trade Relations and Global Legal Order during Covid-19. One of the papers highlighted on why Japanese spend more time in watching Television. One paper compared the Ethnic Relation between Pribumi and Chinese Indonesian Students in Taiwan. There was a paper on how Multiple Intelligence Strategies can be helpful in developing reading comprehension skills among Junior high school learners.

There was an important paper on Cultural Landscapes of ancient cities of Angkor and several issues in Asian region were discussed during the Conference. We learnt about the trend of Vietnamese migrants in Japan and their adaptation strategies. There was an interesting comparative study on Kashmir and Palestine in the conference.

On the whole, it was a useful and purposeful Conference. It was hoped that the next Conference would be an offline conference where the delegates would be able to interact with each other in person.

Dr. Prabhath Patabendi
Convener ICAS2021

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Sociopolitical Mutual Understanding Between Western Liberal Democracies and the People's Republic of China

Gustavo Juan Álvarez Castro
Comillas Pontifical University, Madrid, Spain

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the ideological interaction between Western liberal democracies and the People's Republic of China from a political, philosophical and socioeconomic perspective. This analysis starts from the identification of the two different sociopolitical entities starting from their theories. Then it follows with what theories are necessary for a sociopolitical mutual understanding concept framework, to ultimately provide an overall perspective on the elements that unites and separates them through a political, social and cultural deconstruction process. This framework has been key to conclude that Western liberal democracies and the People's Republic of China are separated by a cultural gap, socially proximate because of the role of individual towards the state and politically aligned in a long-term democracy-oriented process.

Keywords: Mutual understanding, deconstruction, sociopolitical, culture.

Introduction

Western liberal democracies (WLD) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are constantly communicating. From EU-China Summits to US tariffs on China trade, every policy, academic research, political speech or media statement WLD and the PRC hold a complex communication process. However, this political, economic and cultural abstract conversation is still incomplete because there is no mutual understanding.

Western liberal democracies are the conglomerate of nation-states that share a common set of western philosophical thoughts and cultural traditions, as well as a sociopolitical structure based on the principles of democracy and liberalism. Those countries are geographically located in North America (USA and Canada), South America (Argentina and Chile), Europe (as a whole), Asia (Japan), Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), and South Africa. Definitely, since the financial crisis of 2008 WLD have suffered an economic downturn. In 2019 the average of GDP growth was 1,7%, being Estonia the highest (4,9%) and South Africa the lowest (0.1%) (World Bank, 2019). In addition, the political landscape is more polarized than ever before due to an increase of far-right parties, migration crises and citizenship mistrust.

On the other hand, the People's Republic of China could be defined as the combination of ancient Confucian traditions and ideas with adapted Western political and economic theories, such as Socialism with Chinese characteristics. The PRC is a continuous developing sociopolitical structure that tries to meet the needs of its society under the principles of 'stability with economic growth' and 'harmony' (Jinping, 2017). On the contrary to WLD, China is in a hegemonic rise. Currently, it's the second largest economy in the world (\$14.43 trillions). In 2019, it registered a stable and high GDP growth of 6.1% and the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) has calculated it will surpass US economy in 2028 (Centre for Economic and Business Research, 2020). Political wise, Xi Jinping has raised its power after ending with presidential terms. The Chinese Communist Party has gone through a restructuring process to make it more centralized and less corrupt (He, 2020).

On an ongoing world order transition based on an interdependent relation between WLD and the PRC, the lack of mutual understanding makes political, economic and cultural confrontation more likely. Therefore, the abovementioned situation requires a research narrative useful to understand and analyze mutual understanding. This research is intended to comprehend 'sociopolitical mutual understanding' (SPMU) between Western Liberal Democracies and the People's Republic of China. It

aims to analyze the interaction between WLD and the PRC at an ideological level. It would create a concept map useful to clarify WLD and the PRC mutual understanding in sociopolitical terms. It's said which are the features that could serve as a nexus for WLD and the PRC to become closer and improve mutual understanding, as well as the features that has been impeding such mutual understanding. It aims to provide an abstract and realistic overview of the political, social and cultural interaction between WLD and the PRC. Moreover, this investigation is *de-facto* a political communication statement. It represents the motivation for creating building and complex narratives useful to grasp human ideological political communication.

Method

The current investigation follows a hybrid methodology based on conceptual analysis from a comparative perspective. 'Conceptual analysis in practice concerns distinguishing terms, analyzing the understandings they refer to, and representing this'. (Myburgh & Tammara, 2013, p. 153). In other words, conceptual analysis constantly plays an essential role when comprehending how concepts get transformed, depending on their time space and geographical location, and the impact they have on how humans perceive themselves and their surroundings. Then, its comparative character comes from comparative analysis. The aim is to develop research in which one or more concepts are conceptually analyzed from two or more different perspectives (Pickvance, 2001). If we combine conceptual analysis and comparative perspective in politics, we have double perspective analysis. This approach allows us to achieve a balanced definition of sociopolitical concepts. In our case, double perspective analysis means understanding the perception that WLD and PRC have over a given sociopolitical concept based on their own theories. Then, once we analyze such perceptions, we can deconstruct them and identify if there is room for sociopolitical mutual understanding. For instance, double perspective analysis would be useful to grasp how WLD and PRC perceive the role of the individual towards the state. After, we proceed to oppose both perceptions in order to analyze their bridging and breaking elements. In the end, double perspective analysis could be applied to any key sociopolitical concept in order to achieve a general overview of sociopolitical mutual understanding between WLD and PRC.

Results and Discussion

The abovementioned methodology has allowed us to create a sociopolitical mutual understanding theoretical framework (Figure 1) based on the Lifeworld Theory (Habermas, 1987). In our case, the lifeworld could be defined as the 'arena' where a (group of) nation-state(s) ideologically develops itself. The result of this ideological and abstract development is a concept. Therefore, the concept it's the representation of ideas and characteristics that define a (group of) nation-state(s).

Each concept belongs to three different sub-worlds: objective, social and subjective. The objective world is related to politics. The objective world is facts; it's said all evidences and 'real' interpretations of ideas that come from social and scientific investigation useful to define a lifeworld.

In the objective world are mainly included political theories that emerge from political science school of thoughts.

The social world represents the individual. The social world is norms and unwritten codes regarding the role of the individual in society. Such role takes into account both private and public life in relation to the state. The objective and the social world are interdependent because it's the actual interaction of both worlds what creates the sociopolitical character of the concept in which a lifeworld presents itself.

The subjective world is culture. The subjective world is the private and inherited experience embedded in each concept. The subjective world automatically refers to culture because there's no more private and previous experience of a nation-state than its identity, traditions and values. The objective and social world are also dependent on the subjective world because the interpretations of the role of the state and the individual are built upon culture. This is the main reason why there are two lifeworlds. Following Methodological Contextualism, it's essential to draw the boundaries of each lifeworld in order to understand it from their own theories. Such approach allows us to comprehend each concept on their own context, avoiding interference from biased perspectives (Tilley, 2000).

Finally, in order to establish a successful comparison between subworlds it's essential to put into practice Deconstruction (Derrida, 1997) to reverse the process that happens in the lifeworld. By reversing a concept, we can analyze each subworld by opposing the basic ideas on which they are built

upon. Through Deconstruction, we can identify bridges and breaks. Bridges are similar contributions to a concept. Through bridges, we can identify common patterns at any of the sub-worlds that could potentially bring two lifeworlds together. Bridges are preconceived agreements that occurred in both lifeworlds during the process of developing a concept. Bridges focus on recognizing and emphasizing which elements could be reinforced to boost sociopolitical mutual understanding between two concepts. On the other hand, breaks are opposed contributions to a concept. Breaks reduce the scope of cooperation. However, they are useful to identify disagreements during the creation of a concept in order to declare if they could be solved or rather be recognized as a latent and embedded issue for sociopolitical mutual understanding.




Figure 1: Sociopolitical Mutual Understanding (Source: Self-elaboration).

The abovementioned sociopolitical mutual understanding theoretical framework, it's an empty and immutable model that could be put into practice only if each lifeworld has been previously addressed. It's said, in order to begin a process of deconstruction, first we need to build each concept by addressing the theories in which subworlds are based on. In our case, we will mention the ideas and theories that currently define Western liberal democracies and the People's Republic of China.

Western liberal democracies are a compendium of states that fall under the classification of 'liberal representative democracies' or 'developmental democracies'. In order to be considered a 'developmental democracy', a government structure should meet the following requisites: popular sovereignty dependent on a fairly distributive voting system, a representative government controlled by a liberal constitution that safeguards individual freedoms and a solid division of powers and roles within the administration (Held, 2006). Moreover, 'developmental democracy' would not take place if the state it's not surrounded by a competitive and free market economy with a quasi-hybrid system of strong private ownership of the means of production and little public enterprises. WLD are culturally logocentric, it's said, built upon a constant dichotomy between opposed terms that depicts reality in a hero-villain narrative. In our case, WLD follow an East-West dichotomy (Pattberg, 2009) that constantly confronts WLD to those socioeconomic systems that are not 'liberal representative democracies'.

The People's Republic of China is a 'neo-authoritarian' system. Neo-authoritarianism is "an enlightened autocracy in which a strong leader adopts undemocratic measures to enforce economic development" (Li, 2015, p. 31). Certainly, neo-authoritarianism is intended to be a political and economic transitional stage between old-fashioned Western authoritarianisms and current Western liberal democracies. Then, its socioeconomic system is a constant adaptation of Socialism with Chinese characteristics to the current Chinese context. In other words, Chinese population has a collective production force role towards the state subject to change regarding the macroeconomic needs of the

PRC (Hongzhi & Xuan, 2011). Moreover, through New Confucianism, the PRC has uplifted 'harmony' as the main cultural value. 'Harmony' provides Chinese culture with a holistic perspective, in which every element in social life requires to be balanced without interference (Solé-Farràs, 2008).

Once political entities are defined, we can begin the deconstruction process. In the objective world, WLD are identified with democracy. WLD have actually monopolized the concept of democracy by attaching the idea of representation to it. In other words, if a political system doesn't fulfill representative democracy requirements' it cannot be considered democratic. In consequence, democracy has become a static concept attached to WLD context, as WLD consider themselves the only correct interpretation of democracy. On the other hand, the PRC is identified with autocracy. However, the PRC doesn't understand autocracy as the opposite of democracy, but as a previous step to achieve democracy. Through neo-authoritarianism, the PRC defines its current political system as a necessary transitional stage to achieve democracy. This perspective allows democracy and autocracy to be comprehended as complementary concepts of a process that intends to give the power to the people, without attaching such concepts to a given sociopolitical context.

In the social world, due to liberalism, WLD frame their citizens as individually autonomous humans that are provided with natural rights. WLD must provide individuals with the right legal and economic framework in order to thrive with freedom. In WLD, although political and economic actions can differ among individuals, they actually have the same goal of becoming economically independent by working and participating from politics through voting. In opposition, Socialism with Chinese characteristics has turned PRC citizens into a collectively autonomous production force. It's said, individuals in China have a group economic role towards the state. The PRC has established a tough apparatus of control at the private level by controlling ideology, and at a public level by not allowing people to take political action neither access to a free market. This framework is intended to reach economic stability based on a vertical hierarchy in which the Chinese Communist Party controls politics, while the population focuses on performing as a collective economic force. Although WLD and the PRC interpretations of the individual are opposites, they represent two paths of activating the economy of the state and maintaining the efficiency of politics.

In the subjective world, WLD are supposed to be the hegemonic power in charge of spreading 'liberal democracy'. Following hero-villain narrative logic, WLD clearly present themselves as humankind's savior against PRC villain strategy of controlling the International political system. Therefore, based on such East-West dichotomy, WLD are doomed to demonstrate its cultural hegemony over the PRC by becoming economically, geopolitically and technologically superior. On the contrary, the PRC comprehends the world cultural spectrum as a holistic balance. Thanks to harmony principle, the PRC doesn't argue cultural strengthening by spreading its traditions and values, but through national economic development. Harmony implicitly requires every culture to not become hegemonic because this attitude would destroy balance. In consequence, PRC has entered the hegemonic run against WLD in order to restore harmony.

Finally, we can affirm there is a solid bridge at the objective world. WLD and PRC could reach an agreement in political theory by rebranding the democracy-autocracy clash as a democratic development timeline. WLD would be considered as a democratic reference since it has actually developed democracy from a liberal perspective, while the PRC would be placed in a transitional stage towards democracy adapted to Chinese political values.

The social world is equally both a bridge and a break. WLD and the PRC have built their political systems upon two completely opposite conceptualizations of the individual towards the state. However, although WLD understands human beings as free individually autonomous units and the PRC as an alienated collectively autonomous force, both political entities have developed mixed socioeconomic systems. First, WLD have created the welfare state through public owned institutions. This political concept requires some part of the population to play a production force role in public office in order to homogenize the population by facilitating the access to essential services. Then, the PRC have gradually opened his state market economy which allows citizens to leave the production force collective by developing highly profitable businesses.

Nevertheless, the subjective world is a massive break since their mutual cultural perception clashes. The PRC harmony principle between cultures is constantly interrupted by WLD hegemonic attitude. Therefore, it's necessary to acknowledge this break as well as its potential negative effect when addressing the abovementioned bridges. Indeed, trying to argue both WLD and the PRC could become

culturally proximate could be counterproductive, since both subjective worlds are inherently opposed both in essence and shape.

Conclusion

This investigation has proved Western liberal democracies and the People's Republic of China confrontation could be reduced. Sociopolitical mutual understanding framework has been useful to address apparently opposite concepts and place them in a defined ideological interaction stage. Definitely, contrary to what have been currently stated in the media and political literature, WLD and PRC could be understood as complementary political entities on a democratic run. Although such conception would require time and effort from scholars and politicians, it's actually feasible. Certainly, WLD should be recognized as the main democratic reference, while PRC also should be acknowledged as a political entity in a transition to democracy adapted to Chinese political values. Then, although PRC and WLD conceptions of the individual towards the state share no common features, their actual socioeconomic developmental processes share similar structures. In the end, both WLD and PRC aim to achieve a functional economy under a resilient political system adapted to national culture. The fact that WLD and PRC present each other's elements, such as the welfare state or market openness, demonstrates a natural trend of creating balanced political systems that widens the scope for sociopolitical mutual understanding.

Nevertheless, every possibility of improving ideological interaction between WLD and PRC should be addressed from a culture-risk perspective. The fact that WLD and PRC have built their sociopolitical systems upon two highly opposed traditions and values always place sociopolitical mutual understanding under constant threat. The cultural gap should be openly accepted and anticipated in order to not fall into a utopian and counterproductive analysis. Therefore, the probability of failing to improve sociopolitical mutual understanding, due to a rapidly escalating cultural clash, should be included in every element that brings WLD and PRC together.

Finally, abstract analysis that are not applied to reality usually lack tangible impact. It's said, WLD and PRC scholars should invest in developing medium-long term cooperative research projects that boost sociopolitical mutual understanding. The current divisive and polarizing ideological clash between WLD and PRC is in urgent need of being counteracted by realistic bonding narratives. Ideological models such as the sociopolitical mutual understanding framework represent an attempt to comprehend the communication of ideas behind human interaction between two political entities. This approach aims to provide experts in political theory, macroeconomics and intercultural communication with a holistic point of view to develop tools and ideas to enhance WLD and the PRC ideological cooperation.

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Trend of Vietnamese Migrants in Japan and Vietnam

Hiroki Furukawa and Kayoko Yamamoto

The University of Electro-Communications, Chofu, Japan

Abstract

According to the latest census by the Immigration Services Agency of Japan, only the number of Vietnamese residents in Japan was increased (up about 36 thousand (8.8%)) in the top 10 foreign groups, and Vietnamese became the second major group instead of South Korea. The rate of increase of Vietnamese residents in Japan in the last 10 years is noteworthy compared to residents of other nationalities. Through this research, we ultimately aim to clarify the backgrounds and purposes of foreign residents in Japan for contributing to better multicultural symbiosis policies of the national and local Japanese governments. For this, we analyzed prefectural and chronical residence status of the top 5 major foreign groups in Japan, and the domestic migration flow of Vietnamese in Vietnam with census data of Japanese Government and Vietnamese Government applying Natural Breaks (Jenks) on GIS (Geographic Information System). By focusing on the chronical changes in the statistical categorization of each prefectural unit in Japan and prefectural unit in Vietnam, we showed Vietnamese residents spread over Japan and the Vietnamese policies would have an impact to the trends of Vietnamese population flows in Vietnam. Moreover, considering the most numerous VISA category of Vietnamese residents in Japan is “Technical Intern Training”, multicultural symbiosis outside the 3 major metropolitan areas in Japan would mean that coexistence with Vietnamese Technical Intern Trainees, especially regarding to provide comfortable working environments.

Keywords: Migration, Labor Export, Japan, Vietnam.

1. Introduction

“Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Japan” defines “Mid to long-term Residents”. They are basically the persons who stay in Japan more than 3 months with Residence Card. Furthermore, “Special Act on the Immigration Control of, inter alia, those who have lost Japanese Nationality pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Japan” also defines “Special permanent residents”. They are basically the persons who have lost Japanese nationalities under the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” or who are the children of a persons who have lost Japanese nationality under the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” in 1952. These “Mid to long-term residents” and “Special permanent residents” are not temporary visitors, and, in a sense, they are migrants in Japan.

According to prompt report on Mar. 31st, 2021, by Immigration Services Agency of Japan (hereinafter referred to as “ISA”), the total number of foreign residents in Japan was 2,887,116. The percentage of foreign nationals residing in Japan was 2.3% out of the total population of Japan which was approximately 125,630,000 as of the end of 2020. Among the top 10 major nationalities in Japan, only the number of Vietnamese residents increased (up 36,085 (8.8%)) compared to the end of 2019), while the numbers of the other all 9 ones decreased. Moreover, Vietnam replaced South Korea as the second largest group.

The rate of increase of Vietnamese in the last 10 years is noteworthy, and press releases of ISA repeatedly mentioned this trend. However, previous researches are for each region in Japan and do not look over the national trend. Moreover, the social science field especially in law, sociology, and economics has been the center of migration research in Japan. Komai (2014) stated that the main research topics in these humanities and social sciences are:

- Law: protecting the human rights of migrants
- Sociology: elucidating the actual conditions of workers' employment and daily life
- Economics: analysis of labor supply and demand

Therefore, we consider that the novelty of this research is to analyze quantitatively the issues that have been dealt with mainly in the humanities and social sciences using GIS (Geographic Information System) from the macro view on national level.

Through this research, we ultimately aim to clarify the backgrounds and purposes of foreign residents in Japan for contributing to better multicultural symbiosis policies of the national and local Japanese governments. For this, we analyzed prefectural and chronological residence status of the top 5 major foreign groups in Japan, and the domestic migration flow of Vietnamese in Vietnam with using Natural Breaks (Jenks) on GIS.

2. Research methods

2.1 Overview of the Research Subject

As it is mentioned in the previous section, it is impossible to ignore the trends of the Vietnamese people flow to consider migration issues of Japan. Therefore, our research target is Vietnamese. The most numerous VISA category of Vietnamese residents in Japan is "Technical Intern Training" and this ratio reaches 46.6%. ISA report (2020) stated that the top 3 reasons why Vietnamese is coming to Japan are 1) To acquire skills and improve its future career, 2) To earn money and send money home and 3) To study. Especially in Vietnamese Technical Intern Training case, these 1) and 2) reasons account for 91.9%. Hence, we need to observe the domestic Vietnamese population flow in Vietnam and their family environment etc. also to understand the reason why they go away. As the above, we analyze 2 subjects which are,

- The Vietnamese residents in Japan by year and prefecture
- The Vietnamese population flow in Vietnam by year and province

for this research.

2.2 Methodology

Ishikawa (2005, 2014) analyzed individual data of the Japanese national census, which is conducted every five years, to show population flow. However, this individual data is not available on Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan (e-Stat). Therefore, we analyze the statistics of foreign residents, which are published every 6 months by ISA with visualizing them on a GIS digital map to intuitively understand the status of foreign residents and the changes of the number of foreign residents. The tangible ways are as follows.

- The number of foreign residents of the top 5 (China, Vietnam, South Korea, Philippines, and Brazil) as of the end of 2020 are entered in each prefecture and by nationalities. The data is surveyed every 6 months from as the end of 2012 and the end of 2020.

The numbers of these 5 countries covers 74.2% of all foreign residents in Japan. The number of nationalities and regions indicated on residence cards and special permanent resident certificates was 194 (excluding statelessness) as of the end of 2020 (ISA press release 2021). Therefore, analyzing the top 5 is considered reasonable and proper also in terms of ABC analysis.

- The number of foreign residents in the survey is displayed on a map of Japan with 5 levels of Natural Breaks (Jenks).

This makes the surveyed data possible to visually represent the distribution of the foreign residents in Japan as well as to statistically cluster the status of residence by prefecture. Moreover, we can adapt this methodology to not only the foreign residents in Japan, but also other peoples in other areas. Hence,

we adopt this methodology to analyze the Vietnamese residents in Vietnam by year and province with using statistic data of Vietnam Government and cited data on a UN report (2016).

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Vietnamese regional transitions in Japan

Figure 1 shows the Vietnamese residency status with the total number of Vietnamese residents in Japan at the time. As the Figure 1 shows, Kanagawa prefecture is the most preferred prefecture as of Dec. 2012, and it is the largest clustering (Cat. I) in Natural Break (Jenks). This is followed by the clustering of Saitama, Tokyo, Aichi, Osaka and Hyogo prefectures as the second largest clustering (Cat. II). Therefore, it can be confirmed that Vietnamese residents are concentrated in so-called the Japanese 3 major metropolitan areas.

On the other hand, over the years, there has been an increase and concentration of Vietnamese residents outside the 3 areas. Hokkaido prefecture is a typical case. It has not been colored until Dec. 2014. This means that it is categorized in the lowest clustering (Cat. V). However, it is categorized in Cat. IV as of Jun. 2015. This shows that the concentration of Vietnamese has begun. After that, it is in Cat. III as of Dec. 2017, in Cat IV again as of Jun. 2018, back to Cat. III in Dec. 2018 and continues to be in Cat. III. The level of clustering has been increased and remained at that level even though the total number of Vietnamese residents has been increasing. This indicates that Hokkaido prefecture continues to be a particular destination of Vietnamese.




Figure 1: Vietnamese residents in Japan.

However, the concentration of all foreign residents in Japan shows another movement. Hokkaido prefecture has been in Cat. V until Jun. 2017 and remains in Cat. IV from Dec. 2017. Neither other nationality concentrated, though Vietnamese are relatively concentrated (Figure 2 and Table 1).




Figure 2: The top 5 foreign residents in Japan as of the end of 2020.

Table 1: Statistical clustering of foreign residents in Hokkaido prefecture as of Dec. 2020 (Cat. I: many, Cat. V: few).

Nationality	Cat.				
	I	II	III	IV	V
ALL				•	
China				•	
Vietnam			•		
Korea				•	
Philippines					•
Brazil					•

3.2 Vietnamese Regional transitions in Vietnam

Figure 3 shows that “Thanh Hoa province” and “Nghe An province” are categorized in the top (Cat. I) based on our analyzing the cited data on UN report (2016) with applying the methodology. Furthermore, Figure 4 shows destinations of Vietnamese domestic migrants from Thanh Hoa province and Nghe An province based on our analyzing Vietnamese national census data applying the methodology. The city names written in Figure 4 are the most particular destination in the year. Figures 5 and 6 show the origins, where the numerous people migrants from, at “the most particular destination” in the year with arrows. The details are as follows.

Figure 4 shows peoples in Thanh Hoa province migrate to both North Vietnam and South Vietnam although they tend to prefer the south. Hanoi City and Binh Duong province are categorized in the top in 2012 and 2015. On the other hand, Figure 4 also shows that peoples in Nghe An province prefers the south. However, the migrant flow from the viewpoint of the destinations shows another trend. In 2012, the most popular destination from Nghe An province was Ho Chi Minh City as Figure 4 shows and it was the biggest human flow to Ho Chi Minh City in the year as Figure 6 shows. In 2013 and 2014 on

Figure 6, the Nghe An people's flows to the annually most popular destination are categorized in Cat. II, and in 2015 and 2016, they are in Cat. III from the viewpoints of the destinations. These indicate the domestic human flows from Nghe An province get weaker for the destinations. However, the human flow from Thanh Hoa province has not been changed. They are in Cat. I or Cat. II every year (Figure 5).




Figure 3: Vietnamese migrant workers in foreign destinations from top 25 labor-sending provinces, 2012-2016.




Figure 4: Destinations where most people migrated to in the year.




Figure 5: Annual major migrants at “destination from Thanh Hoa province”.




Figure 6: Annual major migrants at “destination from Nghe An province”

While on the contrary, the tide of Vietnamese migrant workers to overseas also changed around 2014 and 2015 (Table 2). The outflow from Thanh Hoa province is downtrend. Besides, that from Nghe An province is uptrend. As these 2 provinces are next to each other and there seem not to be big differences in regional characteristics, we consider that differences in labor policies in the two provinces, such as the emphasis on domestic versus foreign labor markets, may have had an impact to the choice of the local migrants' destination and the actual flows.

Table 2: Vietnamese migrant workers in foreign destination, 2012-2016.

	Thanh Hoa	Nghe An
2012	11,000	11,000
2013	8,092	11,671
2014	10,596	10,900
2015	9,925	12,811
2016	8,119	16,457
Total	47,732	62,839

The UN report (2016) stated that “the Government of Viet Nam had a long-established policy to encourage contractual overseas labor migration”. Moreover, this report also mentioned “economic factors are key drivers of international labour migration” with citing a passage from The Review of Vietnamese Migration Abroad (Consular Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), and also stated “an oversupply of domestic labour, especially in rural areas of the Red River Delta, north central and central coastal regions and Mekong Delta pushes migrants to seek livelihood opportunities in overseas labour markets”. In the future, we will further examine the backgrounds between “individual’s factors that determine whether to go abroad or with Vietnam” and “Vietnamese labor policies” with implementing questionnaire to Vietnamese individuals and governmental bodies.

4. Conclusions and Future Study

Without analyzing big data such as individual census data, we show the status of residence only from data that is widely available statistic, and we clarify the characteristics also. Particularly we show that the results can generate a statistical perspective by discussing the results of quantitative analysis using the public data and GIS on existing research targets in the humanities and social sciences. The number of Chinese residents is the largest, however they tend to reside in major metropolitan areas. Furthermore, South Korean, Filipino and Brazilian residents show similar trends. On the contrary, Vietnamese residents spread over Japan. Therefore, considering the most numerous VISA category of Vietnamese residents in Japan is “Technical Intern Training”, multicultural symbiosis outside the 3 major metropolitan areas would mean that coexistence with Vietnamese Technical Intern Trainees, especially regarding to provide comfortable working environments.

Acknowledgements

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A Preliminary Study on Ethnic Relation between Pribumi and Chinese Indonesian Students in Taiwan

Chun-Yeh Lin
National Chi Nan University, Taiwan

Abstract

Recent years, more and more Indonesian Pribumi and Chinese Indonesian students study in Taiwan's higher educational institutes where these two groups may have more chance to contact with each other than they were in Indonesia. The purpose of this preliminary study is to explore the ethnic relation between Pribumi and Chinese Indonesian students in Taiwan by their contact experience and contact interaction. The questionnaire was designed to gauge two main aspects: (1) the correlation between academic background and the inter-ethnic relation; (2) their interaction situation on university campuses in Taiwan. And the questions are categorized by four main dimensions, Ethnic Accommodation, Ethnic Acculturation, Ethnic Assimilation and Ethnic Distance. From the analysis, there is no direct relevance between respondents' academic background and inter-ethnic relation which overturn the statement from literatures. And in terms of contact interaction, these two groups show their positive way on Acculturation and Assimilation. However, there are subtle significance differences on Accommodation and Distance. Implications and recommendations are also presented and discussed.

Keywords: Chinese Indonesians, ethnic relation, intergroup contact, Pribumi.

Introduction

Indonesia went through Orde Baru (New Order) from 1967 to 1988 under the governance of Suharto. During Suharto's regime, the government tried to erase ethnic Chinese's culture by assimilation policy. Ethnic Chinese were consequently estranged from their own culture which was gradually revive in the post-Suharto era. However as ethnic minority in Indonesia, at only about 1.2 per cent of the population,¹ Chinese Indonesians faced and are facing many challenges and changes in the society of Indonesia after Reformasi period (Reform Era). Therefore, most of the ethnic Chinese went to private or international/bilingual schools in Indonesia. Since their parents prefer to send their children to private Chinese schools in Indonesia to learn more Chinese culture and to maintain their Chinese identity, Chinese Indonesians and pribumi have little interaction while in the school. Based on the review of Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, and Christ (2011) from 515 studies, intergroup contact is believed to reduce prejudice and tension. Yet the evidence also shows that the situation may even worsen according to different conditions. But the argument also points out that only individual but not group level is able to operate. However, it's still obvious that cross-group contact is an indispensable element. On the basis of the latest statistics, there are 8,534 Indonesian students seeking degrees in Taiwan's universities,² including Chinese and native Indonesians (also known as "pribumi").³ Under this circumstance, these two groups ought to have more chances to contact with each other in the campuses or school occasions than they were in Indonesia. This study tries to examine the relation between pribumi and Chinese Indonesians studying in Taiwan in order to understand how their contact experiences are and impressions to each other.

¹ Coppel, Charles, A. 2017. "Reassessing Assumptions about Chinese Indonesians".
<https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/reassessing-assumptions-about-chinese-indonesians/>

² Source: The Ministry of Education, Taiwan

³ In 1998, B.J. Habibie, the 3rd President of Indonesia, issued Presidential Instruction No. 26 to prohibit the usage of the phrases pribumi and non-pribumi for eradicating the discrimination. However, in order to define the ethnicity clearly, the term of pribumi is applied in this study for academic use only, referring native Indonesians whose ancestors root are from the archipelagos.

Literature Review

From the discussion of Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, and Christ (2011), intergroup contact was initially studied by social psychologists in the 1930s and 1940s. It was not until 1954 that Allport brought up his intergroup contact theory, leading the research on this field for five decades. “He noted the contrasting efforts of intergroup contact- usually reducing but sometimes exacerbating prejudice” (Pettigrew et al., 2011: 273). Amir (1969) examined the contact hypothesis in ethnic relations and also stated that prejudice might be reduced only when contacting under equal status. He even concluded that “the assumption that contact always lessens conflicts and stresses between ethnic groups seems naive” (Amir, 1969: 339). Therefore, the characters of contact situation, participants and the attitudes/behaviours are the critical variables. And Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) concluded the three main mediators by the method of meta-analysis for the basic contention of reducing prejudices: “(1) enhancing knowledge about the outgroup, (2) reducing anxiety about intergroup contact, and (3) increasing empathy and perspective taking” (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008: 922). However, the value of increased knowledge is the weakest mediator among these three. So we can see that most of the researches on intergroup contact responded to Allport’s influential volume, *The Nature of Prejudice*, which proposed the idea of contact as the means to reduce prejudice, based on four positive features: “(1) equal status of the groups in the situation, (2) common goals, (3) intergroup cooperation, and (4) the support of authorities, law or custom” (Pettigrew et al., 2011: 273).

In order to test Allport’s Contact Hypothesis, Brown, Eller, Leeds, and Stace (2007) conducted a longitudinal study of inter-school contact and attitudes by questionnaire composed by three main sets of measures, namely contact quality, typicality, and intergroup attitude. Summarily, there are three main findings from their study: more favourable attitudes towards the outgroup, more positive association between quality of contact and favourable attitude, and predictable infra-humanisation by contact. Thus, they concluded that, “as originally hypothesised by Allport, contact with members of an outgroup can improve intergroup attitudes, but especially if those people can be seen as representative of their group” (Brown et al., 2007: 692). But does intergroup contact typically reduce prejudice? Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) pointed out that “greater contact is routinely associated with less prejudice. And these effects are significantly larger for majority groups than for minority groups” (Pettigrew et al., 2011: 274).

In view of this, Dovidio, Love, Schellhaas, Hewstone (2017) reviewed the research developments over the past 20 years, and identified some issues to provide a comprehensive concept for future study. In their study, they sorted five facets characterized intergroup contact research for the past two decades, including Forms of Contact (extended, vicarious, imagined, and virtual contact), Mediating Mechanisms, Moderating Factors (typicality, group status, and contact valence), Nature and Temporal Stage of the Intergroup Exchange, and Outcomes of Contact. Although those researches, aiming at reducing the bias of intergroup contact, had significant advances, there are still some lacuna needed to be clarified. So, they suggested that the best means is not just focusing on the reducing prejudice, but also producing more equitable outcomes from the integration of intergroup relations.

And in the survey from Mustapha, Azman, Karim, Ahmad, and Lubis (2009), they examined the level of interracial/ethnic integration among undergraduate students in Malaysia where there is ethnic diversity in higher education campus, proving that the environmental conditions are as important as the interpersonal contact in terms of enhancing the ethnic relation, especially in organized campus activities. They also pointed out that “polarisation in higher education is said to occur when ethno-groupings thrive but these groups, due to their academic background, are more prone to tolerance and understanding of the other ethnic groups” (Mustapha et al. 2009: 11). Therefore, the concept will be also applied in this study to review the relationship between the educational background and ethnic relation of the subjects in my study.

Methodology

This study is conducted by questionnaire survey- compiled by Mustapha et al. (2009), and the target respondents are the Indonesian pribumi students and ethnic Chinese students studying in Taiwan. 136 respondents in total are randomly selected, 62 from pribumi and 74 are ethnic Chinese of whom, to complete the questionnaire. The respondents were requested to fill in the demographic information in the first section of the questionnaire, shown in Table 1, such as ethnicity, gender, age, religion...etc.

Table 1: Demographic information of the respondents.

Characteristic	Pribumi		Chinese Indonesian	
	Number (n)	Percentage (%)	Number (n)	Percentage (%)
Ethnicity:				
Bangkanese	1	1.6	-	-
Batak	2	3.2	-	-
Batak-Javanese	1	1.6	-	-
Buginese	1	1.6	-	-
Javanese	40	64.5	-	-
Javanese-Sumatran	1	1.6	-	-
Malay	4	6.5	-	-
Minangkabau	2	3.2	-	-
Palembangnese	1	1.6	-	-
Sumatran	1	1.6	-	-
Sumbawane	1	1.6	-	-
Sundanese	6	9.8	-	-
Timorese	1	1.6	-	-
<i>Total</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>74</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Gender:				
Male	25	40.3	28	37.8
Female	37	59.7	46	62.2
Age:				
Under 20	2	3.2	39	52.7
21-30	38	61.3	32	43.2
31-40	12	19.4	3	4.1
41-50	9	14.5	0	0
Above 50	1	1.6	0	0
Religion:				
Islam	51	82.3	4	5.4
Christianity	11	17.7	19	25.7
Catholicism	0	0.0	26	35.1
Hinduism	0	0.0	0	0.0
Buddhism	0	0.0	24	32.4
Confucianism	0	0.0	1	1.4
Degree seeking in Taiwan:				
PhD	31	50.0	5	6.8
Master	22	35.5	5	6.8
Bachelor	9	14.5	64	86.4

In this study, two hypotheses are presented: (1) the education background of higher degree may affect the inter-ethnic relation; (2) these two groups ought to have more chances to contact with each other in the campuses or school occasions than they were in Indonesia with the result that they interact with each other more harmonious and united. The survey was meant to measure the degree of ethnic relation of Indonesian students in university campus of Taiwan. Thus, 9 questions of the second section and 26 questions of the final section were accordingly designed to identify students' Inter-Ethnic Contact Experience and Inter-Ethnic Interaction respectively. And a 5-point Likert scale was used from 5 (Almost Always / Strongly Agree) to 1 (Never / Strongly Disagree).

Table 2 reveals the description for the questionnaire of the second and the final sections with their overall means and standard deviations as shown in Table 2. This instrument is tested for the reliability by Cronbach Alpha. The results of $\alpha=0.92$ for Inter-Ethnic Contact Experience and $\alpha=0.83$ for Inter-Ethnic Interaction indicate the instrument is a relatively good consistency for this survey.⁴ And the range used of Means is as listed below.

⁴ According to George & Mallery (2003), it is generally believed that the value of "alpha reliability" has the following meanings: (1) $\alpha \geq 0.9$ means Excellent consistency; (2) $0.9 > \alpha \geq 0.8$ means Good consistency; (3) $0.8 > \alpha \geq 0.7$ means Acceptable consistency; (4) $0.7 > \alpha \geq 0.6$ means Questionable consistency; (5) $0.6 > \alpha \geq 0.5$ means Poor consistency; (6) $0.5 > \alpha$ means Unacceptable consistency.

- 3.76 – 5.00 Almost Always / Strongly Agree
 2.51 – 3.75 Sometimes / Agree
 1.26 – 2.50 Every Once in a While / Neither Agree nor Disagree
 1.26 – 2.50 Rarely / Disagree
 1.00 – 1.25 Never / Strongly Disagree

Table 2: Overall Means and Standard Deviations.

Dimensions	Overall Means	Standard Deviations
Inter-Ethnic Contact Experience (9 QNS)	3.01	0.11
Inter-Ethnic Interaction (26 QNS)	3.79	0.20
- Ethnic Accommodation (5 QNS)	4.19	0.24
- Ethnic Acculturation (7 QNS)	3.85	0.15
- Ethnic Assimilation (7 QNS)	4.09	0.14
- Ethnic Distance (7 QNS)	3.14	0.11

For data analysis, Pearson's Chi-square Test is used for the result of data analysis in order to view if the academic background indeed affects the inter-ethnic relation or not; while Independent Sample T Test and One-Sample T Test are applied to test the interaction between the two groups.

Results

Pearson's Chi-square Test

Also known as The Chi-square Test of Independence, Chi-square test is used to determine if there is a significant relationship between two categorical variables. Data analysis is examined for verifying the correlation between academic background and inter-ethnic relation. The samples are divided into three groups by their degree studying in Taiwan, that is Bachelor (n=73), Master (n=27) and PhD (n=36). The statistic for Contact Experience and Interaction collected from the questionnaire are cross-compared separately with the variable of degree.

Table 3: Cross-Compared Analysis by Degree in Taiwan.

	Contact Experience			Interaction		
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	70.891 ^a	64	0.259	84.238 ^b	82	0.411
Likelihood Ratio	82.649	64	0.058	95.542	82	0.146
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.302	1	0.129	0.027	1	0.869
N of Valid Cases	136			136		
	a. 99 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.			b. 126 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.		

From Table 3, the significance of Contact Experience ($\alpha=0.259$) and that of Interaction ($\alpha=0.411$) are both greater than the chosen significance level which means no difference between the distributions.

Independent Sample T Test

The Independent Samples T Test compares the means of two independent groups in order to determine whether there is statistical evidence that the associated groups mean are significantly different. The questions from the third section of the questionnaire are categorized into four dimensions: Ethnic Accommodation, Ethnic Acculturation, Ethnic Assimilation, and Ethnic Distance. The hypothesis of the T Test is as listed below.

Table 4: T Test for Four Dimensions.

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Differen ce	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Accommo- dation	Equal variances assumed	1.373	0.243	2.200	134	0.030	0.24420	0.11100	0.02467	0.46373
	Equal variances not assumed			2.229	133.889	0.027	0.24420	0.10954	0.02755	0.46086
Accultu- ration	Equal variances assumed	0.148	0.701	-1.269	134	0.206	-0.12125	0.09551	-0.31015	0.06766
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.274	131.492	0.205	-0.12125	0.09517	-0.30951	0.06701
Assimi- lation	Equal variances assumed	2.801	0.097	1.698	134	0.092	0.19118	0.11260	-0.03153	0.41389
	Equal variances not assumed			1.740	132.664	0.084	0.19118	0.10990	-0.02621	0.40857
Distance	Equal variances assumed	0.000	0.999	-2.412	134	0.017	-0.35801	0.14842	-0.65155	-0.06448
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.430	132.809	0.016	-0.35801	0.14732	-0.64941	-0.06662

As a result of the P-values of Levene's Test for Equality of Variances for the four dimensions from Table 4 all being greater than the chosen significance level (0.243 for Accommodation, 0.701 for Acculturation, 0.097 for Assimilation, and 0.999 for Distance), the significance (2-tail) value should be the row of "Equal variances assumed." Therefore, the P-values are 0.030 for Accommodation, 0.206 for Acculturation, 0.092 for Assimilation, and 0.017 for Distance. And only the values of Accommodation and Distance are less than the chosen significance level. The null hypothesis (H0) is rejected, and conclude that there are gaps between Pribumi and Chinese Indonesians on Ethnic Accommodation and Ethnic Distance.

One-Sample T Test

In order to investigate the details of the two dimensions on Accommodation and Distance, question by question comparison are analyzed by One-Sample T Test which can examine whether the mean of a population is statistically different from a known or hypothesized value. Due to the lengthy table, Table 5 only presents the simplified result.

Table 5: Summary for the result of comparison between the two groups.

Dimension	No.	Question	Sig. (2-tailed)		Comparison
			Pribumi to Chinese Indonesian	Chinese Indonesian to Pribumi	
Accommodation (P=0.030)	1	Respect beliefs and cultures	0.000	0.000	P = CI*
	2	Have roommate from the other group	0.066	0.201	P < CI
	3	Good perceptions toward the other group	0.017	0.051	P < CI
	4	Be accepted by the other group	0.339	0.000	P > CI
	5	Campus activities foster tolerance and respect	0.644	0.303	P > CI
Distance (P=0.017)	6	Stereotypes on the other group	0.015	0.001	P > CI
	7	Difficult to interact with the other group	0.133	0.131	P > CI
	8	Uncomfortable being alone in the other group	0.046	0.000	P > CI
	9	The other group only interact with themselves	0.003	0.000	P > CI
	10	Change impression after contacting	0.654	0.091	P > CI
	11	Interact only when being similar age	0.115	0.134	P < CI
	12	Interact only when studying the same degree	0.000	0.003	P < CI
* P is short for Pribumi and CI is short for Chinese Indonesian in the column of comparison.					

On the dimension of Accommodation, Pribumi and Chinese Indonesians are equal on no. 1. Pribumi is more negative than Chinese Indonesian on no. 2 and 3, on the contrary, it was more positive on no. 4 and 5. And on the dimension of Distance, Pribumi is more positive than Chinese Indonesian except for no. 11 and 12. In terms of significance level, there are a total of five items where the P values of both groups are less than 0.05, namely no. 1, 6, 8, 9, and 12. In addition, Pribumi also gets P value less than 0.05 on no. 3, while Chinese Indonesians are on no. 4. Comparing with the P value from Independent Sample T Test, Pribumi's P values on no. 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 of are less than that of Accommodation and Distance, and Chinese Indonesians' are on no. 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 12.

Discussion and Conclusion

Academic Background and Inter-ethnic Relation

The results of the analysis indicate that Contact Experience and Interaction between interethnic groups have no direct relevance with the respondents' academic background. The overall means of the frequency on Contact Experience of these two groups is "sometimes" ($m=3.01$), yet the school-types these two groups attended in Indonesia being less likely to have classmates from the other ethnic group, and it shows "strongly agree" ($m=3.79$) in terms of Contact Interaction. And when the cross-comparison with academic backgrounds presents that there is no correlation between the distributions, this seems to overturn Mustapha, Azman, Karim, Ahmad, and Lubis's statement that these groups prone to tolerate and understand each other due to the academic background. It can be inferred, under this premise of studying in different degrees on university campus environment, that not academic background makes each other more tolerant, but it is closer to each other because of frequent contact and interaction under the status of being students in school. This argument is more in line with Allport's theory that positive effects of intergroup contact occur in contact situations characterized by equal status, and so does Amir's; prejudice might be reduced only when contacting under equal status, especially the survey result of Contact Interaction in this study tends to pleasant way, almost little prejudice existing.

Inter-Ethnic Interaction

Generally speaking, the inter-ethnic interaction between these two groups are highly accepted and spirited up, and there are only some subtle significant differences. Even from the discussion of

Academic Background and Inter-Ethnic Relation, these two groups accommodate and tolerance each other well under the equal status. However, the analysis for Accommodation reveals that in respect of each other's beliefs and culture, the two ethnic groups still have room for improvement. And these two groups both have the perception issues toward each other, but Pribumi's perception toward Chinese Indonesian are poorer. This fact reflects the statement from Herlijanto (2016) that the current perception from Pribumi to Chinese Indonesians is still complicated even negative perceptions of the Chinese have declined in Indonesian society over the past 20 years. And the point that Chinese Indonesians feel deeply not accepted by Pribumi also explains why Chinese Indonesians are uncomfortable when being alone with Pribumi from the statistic outcome of Distance. As what Brahma (2018) pointed out, "though modern Indonesia has accepted the ethnic Chinese as a part of the nation, till date, any little provocation is capable of generating insecurity and suspicion regarding the role of ethnic Chinese in the socio-political and economic arena of Indonesia" (Brahma, 2018: 274). Overall, even though the survey proves a high degree of positive correlation on Contact Interaction, the impression of each other while in Indonesia may continue to the campuses in Taiwan, resulting in the worst situation, and that is polarization.

Recommendations

The policy of Taiwan's overseas Chinese students' recruitment has been implementing for more than seven decades and the output of Taiwan Higher Education has also been carrying out for a decade. Since then the university campuses in Taiwan tend to be more and more diverse on nationality, ethnicity and culture. How to make inter-ethnic groups live in harmony and understand different cultures is not just the responsibility of the university, but students themselves should also learn to improve or strengthen their ability to get along with different groups. Efficient communication may increase mutual consideration for one another and reduce unnecessary prejudice. Schoem and Hurtado (2001) also assumed that the major challenge we face in this democratic society is the lack of intergroup dialogue which may create a more just, harmonious, and strong democracy.

This study refers a lot to the research from Mustapha et al. (2009) on ethnic contact among diverse students in Malaysian higher education institutions where the students are essentially in the environment of ethnic interaction and contact experience. However, the respondents from this survey may not have as many chances as those from Malaysian campuses of contacting with multi-ethnic groups on university campuses in Taiwan. Therefore, there can be more discussion on this point in the future. Moreover, this preliminary study is only a small-scale research on this topic, and the samples must be larger for the future examination on the relevant issues. And also, qualitative method should be applied for the extend verification. By using the result of quantitative survey as the framework, the advanced qualitative interviews may be able to make up for the missing aspects and explore further.

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Political Warfare Involving Active Measures Using Propaganda and Disinformation on Papuan Conflict by Non State Actors Against Indonesia

M. Alfi Rajabi Nasution¹ and Poltak Partogi Nainggolan²

¹University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

²University of Freiburg, Breisgau, Germany

Abstract

The escalation of the conflict in Papua has intensified due to the high levels of destabilization efforts carried out by the Papuan Separatist Terrorist Group. Other non-state actors such as Veronica Koman and Benny Wenda also polarized the escalation of the conflict with provocative content and discredited the Indonesian government, through propaganda and disinformation activities. This phenomenon indicates an act of political war involving active measures through offensive and systematic efforts using disinformation, propaganda, fraud and destabilization in the Papuan conflict against the Indonesian government. This study uses a qualitative method, with a descriptive analysis approach that aims to reveal the alleged existence of active measures by using propaganda and disinformation on the Papuan conflict by non-state actors who threaten the national interests of the Republic of Indonesia. Data collection was obtained through interview techniques, social media observations and literature study. The results of propaganda analysis reveal that propaganda and disinformation carried out by non-state actors such as Veronica Koman and Benny Wenda have shaped public opinion of human rights violations, colonialism and discrimination against racism by the Indonesian government, this opinion is designed to create an international reaction to pressure the Indonesian government. Active Measures attacking Indonesia has created favorable conditions in the Papua conflict for Papuan terrorist separatist groups to achieve the objectives of Active Measures activities, namely to realize the independence of Papua from the Republic of Indonesia.

Keywords: Active Measures, Propaganda, Disinformation, Non State Actor, Conflict Papua.

Introduction

The escalation of conflict in Papua intensified, marked by the death of Major General TNI (Posthumous) IG Putu Danny Kabinda Papua while carrying out security restoration operations in Dambet Village, Beoga District, Puncak Regency on April 25, 2021. After the destabilization efforts carried out by the West Papua National Liberation Army (WPNLA) the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) through increased violent terror attacks. In response to this situation, President Joko Widodo emphasized that there was no place for armed groups in Indonesia, who then ordered the Indonesia National Army (TNI) and Indonesian National Police (Polri) to pursue and arrest all the rebel groups. (The Straits Times, 2021) Followed by Menkopolhukam Mahfud MD who labeled the WPNLA as a Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group (KSTP). (The Jakarta Post, 2021) However, human rights activists provoking the President's call, will trigger revenge against indigenous Papuans. (The New York Times, 2021)

The facts revealed by the Indonesian Government were distorted by human rights activists Veronica Koman and Benny Wenda. Veronica stated that in the end the civilians and indigenous Papuans would bear the brunt of the conflict and firefight because the Indonesian government had allowed them to kill them for revenge. (Radio New Zealand Pacific, 2021) Furthermore, on 27 April 2021 the ULMWP website published Benny Wenda's official statement, that President Widodo's order would lead to more killings, torture and suffering of the Papuan people. (Wenda, 2021) In his statement, Benny accused Indonesia of illegally invading and occupying Papua for nearly 60 years, as well as committing genocide against the Papuan people. Benny even encouraged the UN High Commissioner

for Human Rights to enter West Papua under the pretext that the Indonesian government had carried out colonization and human rights violations.

Veronica and Benny, who live outside Indonesia, polarized the escalation of the conflict by making comments that were provocative and discredited the Indonesian government. This means that Veronica Koman repeated her actions in 2019, she became a suspect and a fugitive from the Police due to her actions in actively spreading 5 provocative content via Twitter for the siege incident at the Papuan Student Dormitory, Surabaya which triggered social unrest in Papua. (Pambudi, 2019) Such provocative acts can be assumed as propaganda efforts that are spread through social media and mainstream media, and are often amplified by international media which discredit the Government of Indonesia. This indicates that non-state actors such as Veronica and Benny have certain interests or the interests of foreign countries are controlling them as proxies in the Papuan conflict that threatens Indonesia's national interests. This phenomenon is similar to the conclusion of Wada's research which reveals that opinion formation through provocative information, disinformation and hoaxes can be categorized as propaganda that is vulnerable to being used by foreign parties as a tool to launch a proxy war in Indonesia. (Wada, 2019)

According to O'Donnel, propaganda is a deliberate and systematic effort to shape perceptions, manipulate cognition, and direct behavior to achieve the desired response from the propagandist. (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012) The definition of Propaganda explained by O'Donnel reinforces the notion that Veronica and Benny are making systematic efforts to influence the public in accordance with their wishes. IPI Executive Director Karyono Wibowo also warned the public to be wary of proxy groups such as activists and NGOs who take advantage of conflict situations in the midst of terror acts by armed criminal groups (KKB) in Papua. For example, like Veronica and her colleagues, consciously or unconsciously they have been actively involved as propagandists in proxy wars. (Berita Satu, 2021) A proxy war is a confrontation between two foreign great powers using a third party to reduce costs and other risks. (Fox, 2019) These third parties are non-state actors such as NGOs, CBOs, remotely controlled groups or individuals. (Nur &, 2018) These methods have also been carried out by the Soviets since the 1920s through *aktivnye meropriyatiya* or active measures, as political warfare includes offensive efforts through disinformation, propaganda, deception and destabilization. (Darczewska & Żochowski, 2017) Active Measures were still being carried out by Russia when the U.S. Election 2016 as a political war strategy both openly and covertly (Grzegorzewski, 2020) to disrupt democracy, America's political system and policy.

The author will use the Russian concept of active measures to reveal the issues being raised. In addition, the author also uses 8 steps of O'Donnel's propaganda analysis, including identification of ideology and goals, context identification, identification of propagandists, identification of audiences, understanding of media utilization techniques, analysis of special techniques to maximize effects, analysis of audience reactions, and impacts and evaluation. (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012) Based on the phenomena described above, the researcher feels that this research is important to analyze the efforts of active measures using propaganda and disinformation on the Papuan conflict by non-state actors against the Indonesian government. The questions in this study are how to analyze the propaganda and disinformation of the Papuan conflict by non-state actors and how to understand the threat of political war using the Papuan conflict issue involving active measures against the Indonesian Government.

Research Methods






This study uses qualitative methods and descriptive analysis approach to explain, interpret and analyze active measures through propaganda and disinformation. Researchers limit non-state actors in the form of individuals in this case, namely Veronica Koman (Individual) and Benny Wenda (Chairman of The United Liberation Movement for West Papua/ULMWP). Data collection was obtained through interview techniques, social media observations and literature study. The technique of checking the validity of the data in this study was carried out through method triangulation.

Discussion

Active Measures are elements of political warfare used by the Russian Intelligence Service through the SVR, FSB and GRU both openly and covertly, both at home and abroad by using propaganda, disinformation, deception, destabilization and sabotage systematically to influence foreign policy and

the political situation in the country of countries that are objects of activity in the context of advancing their interests. However, this study does not discuss whether there are Russian intelligence operations involving Active Measures using propaganda and disinformation on the Papuan conflict through non-state actors in Indonesia, as he did in the U.S. Election 2016 in Rid's research. Researchers will use the concept of active measures as a method to uncover the problems raised. In addition, this study will explain how the results of the analysis of the evidence of propaganda and disinformation that have been massively spread.

The author had made observations in the period from January to d. August 2021 on Twitter social media activities that spread propaganda and disinformation on the Papuan conflict by groups of non-state actors in the form of individuals, such as Veronica Koman and Benny Wenda. As for some of the evidence from the content of propaganda and disinformation that is used as an object in analyzing these problems can be seen in the following table:

Narrative	Propaganda and Disinformation
<p>Veronica Koman</p> <p>On April 29, 2021, a post via the social media platform twitter, responded to the Indonesian Government's policy regarding the TPNPB OPM as a terrorist organization. The narrative content seeks to shape public opinion that the Government of Indonesia's policies will increase human rights violations and escalate armed conflict.</p>  <p>https://twitter.com/VeronicaKoman/status/1387699806756298757</p>	<p>On April 29, 2021, through the Twitter social media platform, spread narration and visualization that the Papuan people are victims of human rights violations by the Indonesian Military, using the hashtag #PAPUANLIVESMATTERS.</p>  <p>https://twitter.com/VeronicaKoman/status/1387758025671331848/photo/4</p>
<p>On May 13, 2021, through the Twitter social media platform, spread narratives and visualizations of solidarity for the people of West Papua and Palestine who are struggling against colonialism..</p>  <p>https://twitter.com/VeronicaKoman/status/1392690028464140289/photo/1</p>	<p>On July 28, 2021, through the social media platform twitter, spread narration and visualization related to #PAPUANLIVESMATTER.</p>  <p>https://twitter.com/VeronicaKoman/status/1387758025671331848/photo/4</p>
<p>Benny Wenda</p> <p>On July 31, 2021, through the social media platform Twitter, urged the UN Human Rights Council to punish Indonesia for systematic racism and discrimination against the Papuan people. Using the hashtags #PapuanLivesMatters and #blacklivesmatter.</p> <p>https://twitter.com/BennyWenda/status/1421473584220938240</p>	 <p>https://twitter.com/BennyWenda/status/1421473584220938240</p>

Analysis of Propaganda and Disinformation by Non-State Actors in the Papua Conflict

In analyzing the content of propaganda and disinformation carried out by non-state actors as shown in the table above, the researcher will use Jowett's and O'Donnell's 8-step propaganda analysis.

The Ideology and Purpose of the Propaganda

In this step, ideology as a perspective that determines the content is accepted and interpreted by the audience. According to Boni Hargens, Executive Director of the Indonesian Electoral College (LPI) that the propaganda content contains the ideology of "identity politics" to attack the state and symbols that represent the State of Indonesia. (Hargens, 2021) On the other hand, the purpose of propaganda is to influence the attitudes and beliefs of the audience according to the wishes of the propagandist. According to Wawan H Purwanto Deputy VII for Communication and Information Affairs of State

Intelligence Agency (BIN) (Purwanto, 2021) the goal is to create a crisis condition so that the issue of Papua becomes the world's attention in order to realize the independence of Papua from the Republic of Indonesia.

The Context in Which the Propaganda Occurs

In this step, it can be analyzed based on the background that happened before. If you look at the propaganda patterns that have been carried out by the armed Papua group, Wawan H. Purwanto identifies several momentums, namely ahead of the commemoration of major holidays such as the OPM Anniversary and International Human Rights Day. In addition, they also take advantage of incidents associated with Tribe, Religion, Race and Inter-Groups (SARA) nuances such as one of the Black Lives Matter in the US. However, when the situation is peaceful and conducive, they continue to try to spread negative propaganda about the presence of non-organic troops who are considered a source of terror for the Papuan people. In crisis conditions, Papuan interest groups abroad become propaganda agents to internationalize the Papua issue by utilizing academic free pulpits and content on social media. (Purwanto, 2021)

Identification of The Propagandist

The identification step can be determined based on the propaganda context, ideology and objectives. Wawan H. Purwanto revealed that Propagandists could be a country that uses third parties such as interest groups in Papua that consistently play on Papuan issues, including the political front, armed front, and clandestine front (the actors come from Papuan individuals and interest groups). (Purwanto, 2021) Supported by the opinion of Boni Hargens that propagandists must have credibility like the figure of Veronica Koman who was successful in becoming a large mouthpiece for an independent Papuan interest group. In addition, they use researchers from abroad to write academic journal manuscripts about Papua from the standpoint of separatism. (Hargens, 2021)

Target Audience

In this step, the audience is selected by the propagandist to take advantage of the potential effectiveness. Boni Hargens revealed that propaganda carried out by a group or individual is easier to target those who have minimal literacy on an issue or problem. Propaganda will also be received more effectively to parties affiliated with or supporting the ideology of the Propagandist. They are free to make interpretations and respond in the form of support for separatists or blasphemy against the Indonesian government. For the domestic environment, the issue of separatism is thick with political overtones. This political factor also explains why anti-government groups are currently also amplifying the Papua issue as useful idiots such as the #Papuanlivesmatter movement. (Hargens, 2021)

Media Utilization Techniques

In this step, modern propaganda uses all available media such as press, television, internet, radio, statements and posters. In its development, Wawan H. Purwanto said that propaganda currently uses more of the digital space, especially since Indonesia is classified as one of the largest internets and social media users in the world. Propagandists will choose media that are faster and cover a wider audience, one of which is social media. (Purwanto, 2021)

Special Techniques to Maximize Effect

In this analysis, propaganda is too complex to limit its technique and can be elaborated on by other techniques. Some of the commonly used techniques are source credibility, opinion leaders and language selection. In line with Boni Hargens, Veronica Koman's use of English narration is a technique used to maximize the effect of propaganda, especially to provoke the international community. (Hargens, 2021) Wawan H. Purwanto added that the use of disinformational narrative content related to apparatus repression was also disseminated through local media, national media and international media. (Purwanto, 2021) Thus, causing past trauma that makes the people of Papua uncomfortable. This condition has shaped the emotions of the indigenous Papuan people to support Papua to break away from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Audience Reaction

Boni Hargens considers that developments in social media or discussion forums, supporters of Free Papua Movement generally express their views openly in public spaces in discussion forums. They criticize the government and always blame the state for handling Papua. Ironically, at the same time, supporters of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia are less strategic because they are too monotonous in the narrative used and the media that distributes it. The less creative narrative of the pro-NKRI group has actually become an indirect form of support for the propaganda for the supporters of Free Papua, and has even become a stimulus for the propaganda launched by the pro-Papua Merdeka group. (Hargens, 2021)

Effects and Evaluation

The success of the propaganda carried out can be seen from the goals to be achieved. Wawan H. Purwanto explained that the current condition of Papua has basically been going on for quite a long time. However, the presence of social media has a significant contribution to the existence of this issue because it continues to be recycled. The presence of social media makes it easier for Papuan actors to apply Papuan issues to foreign countries and invite international sympathy or reaction. (Purwanto, 2021) Massive propaganda and disinformation actions carried out have the potential to cause an international reaction that discredits the Indonesian government regarding the handling of the Papua conflict. This indicates that the objectives of the propaganda being played are achieved.

Political Warfare Involving Active Measures in Papuan Conflict Against Indonesia

The concept of Active Measures includes offensive efforts aimed at forcing opponents to act in a desired manner through the spread of narratives (disinformation and propaganda) and actions (subversion, provocation, action, destabilization, paramilitary action, etc.). Active Measures are implemented by combining these various techniques that are used in operations aimed at influencing the international environment and influencing adversaries to create favorable conditions for successfully carrying out foreign policy objectives in the target country of the operation. (Darczewska & Żochowski, 2017) Boni Hargens and Wawan H. Purwanto see the development of conflict escalation which is increasing through efforts of destabilization, sabotage, propaganda, deception and disinformation that systematically occurs in Papua and outside Papua in the Papua conflict very clearly reflects the practice of Active Measures carried out by many non-state actors such as Veronica Koman (Individual), Benny Wenda (Chairman of The ULMWP) and the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group. (Hargens, 2021)

However, according to Emanuel Gobay, the Head of Papua Legal Aid (LBH) Papua, that Veronica Koman and Benny Wenda's propaganda and opinion-forming actions are seen as an effort to encourage the State to enforce the provision that everyone is free from discrimination, racism and injustice in Papua. Human rights must be the responsibility of the State, especially the Government of Indonesia. (Gobay, 2021) This is different from the research of Nasution and Wiranto that the propaganda on the issue of racism carried out by Veronica Koman has damaged social relations between indigenous Papuans and other Indonesian people, and has been proven to have created conflicts and mass riots in Papua and West Papua on August 19, 2019 until 23 September 2019 which can threaten national security. (Nasution & Wiranto, 2020) The existence of destabilization actions carried out by the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group, is their tactic to provoke a response from the Indonesian government through the TNI-Polri which they will later use by distorting the facts to create an issue and opinion that there are violations of human rights, colonialism and racism discrimination committed by Indonesian government in Papua. This is supported by the opinion of Wawan H. Purwanto that these issues are played by non-state actors who support Papuan independence through propaganda and disinformation activities both at home and abroad. This cycle occurs repeatedly and is continuously recycled to attract international attention until the goal of liberating Papua from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is achieved. (Purwanto, 2021)

According to Boni Hargens, the issue of the Papuan conflict has also undergone changes in political dynamics, initially this issue was special for human rights activists and social activists. However, in its development, the Papua issue has become an issue of power politics at the national level, where there are opposition parties to the Government of President Joko Widodo who use the Papua issue as a political tool to attack and discredit the Government of Indonesia. This political factor shows that the current anti-government (opposition) group is also amplifying the Papua issue as Useful Idiots such as

in the #Papuanlivesmatter movement. (Hargens, 2021) Right-wing radical groups in political Islam such as ex-FPI and ex-HTI also suddenly became supporters of Papuan separatist groups, not because they understood and supported the issue of an independent Papua but because they wanted to disrupt the current government. Solidarity for the independence of Papua which is widespread in Java and other islands in Indonesia is inseparable from the political game of opposition which is quite disturbing and hampers the Government. Opposition parties who take advantage of the issue of Papuan independence for political purposes attack the Indonesian government unknowingly playing a role designed by foreign parties as *Useful Idiots* which will ultimately threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

The current existence of Active Measures has created favorable conditions in the Papua conflict for Papuan terrorist separatist groups to achieve the objectives of the Active Measures activity, namely to realize the independence of Papua from the Republic of Indonesia. Systematic efforts to discredit the Government of Indonesia, manipulate the media with Propaganda (public opinion about human rights violations committed by Indonesia) and political provocations through Useful Idiots are feared to influence domestic public opinion and the international public to create a specific international reaction, namely pressuring the Indonesian Government to release Papua from the Republic of Indonesia. Active Measures does not rely on facts, this action relies on the ability of propaganda, deception, disinformation and sabotage including espionage. They use the democratic space (read: the press) as a medium to carry out active actions in creating political destabilization that is detrimental to the Government of Indonesia.

Conclusion

The results of propaganda analysis reveal that propaganda and disinformation carried out by non-state actors such as Veronica Koman and Benny Wenda have formed public opinion that in Papua there have been violations of human rights, colonialism and discrimination against racism that harm Indonesia, these conditions are designed to create an international reaction to pressure the Government Indonesia to release Papua from the Republic of Indonesia. The development of conflict escalation that is increasing through destabilization, sabotage, propaganda, deception and disinformation efforts that systematically occur in Papua and outside Papua related to the Papua conflict has reflected the practice of Active Measures carried out by many non-state actors. Active Measures attacking Indonesia has created favorable conditions in the Papua conflict for Papuan terrorist separatist groups to achieve the objectives of Active Measures activities, namely to realize the independence of Papua from the Republic of Indonesia. The planned Active Measures have created an opposition party to the government of President Joko Widodo who is using the issue of Papuan independence for political purposes to attack the Government of the Republic of Indonesia that has unknowingly played a role designed by foreign parties as Useful Idiots which will ultimately threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

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The Ombudsman System of Thailand and its Roles in Thai Politics

Phimphisa Sanhirun
National Chi Nan University, Taiwan

Abstract

This paper intends to study the ombudsman system's organic composition in Thailand and explore their roles in Thai politics. Because of the intention to transfer government power from the administration to the people, the term "Ombudsman" was first mentioned in 1974 in the draft Constitution, and the enactment of the Organic Act on Parliamentary Ombudsman to support and define practical details for implementation were approved by the parliament of Thailand in 1999. The purpose of establishing the ombudsman system is to deploy special legislative institutes to investigate and redress people's grievances. On September 19, 2006, The Thai government was overthrown by a coup d'état, and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in 1997 was abolished. However, the ruling group "Council for Democratic Reform" (CDR) retained the function of the Ombudsman as an independent organization to continue to perform duties to redress the grievance of people. In the status quo, the Ombudsman is given additional duties and has the power to recommend the competent government agencies to revise laws, regulations, ordinances, rules or orders, or operational procedures. The Ombudsman system is particularly distinguished in the Thai political situation; by studying its organic composition and its roles, we will better understand the Thai political situation and predict its development in the future in a more precise manner.

Keywords: Ombudsman system, Thai politics, military coup, Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (2017).

Introduction

This paper intends to study the organic composition of the ombudsman system in Thailand and explore their roles in Thai politics. Due to the intention of transferring government power from the administration to the people, the term "ombudsman" was first introduced in the draft Constitution in 1974, and the enactment of the Organic Act on Parliamentary Ombudsman to support and establish practical details for implementation was approved by the parliament of Thailand in 1999. The purpose of establishing the ombudsman system is to deploy special legislative institutes to investigate and redress people's grievances.

From the establishment of the ombudsman system in 1999 until now, after two military coups overthrew the elected governments in 2006 and 2014, respectively; however, the ruling groups retained the function of the Ombudsman as an independent organization to continue to perform duties.

In the status quo, additional duties and powers are granted to the "Ombudsman," and we are interested in the reasons that made military ruling groups after suspended the Constitution of the Thai Kingdom but retained the power of the ombudsman office to perform their duty, this may suggest that the ombudsman system has a unique role in Thai politics.

The Ombudsman system is particularly distinguished in the Thai political situation; by studying its organic composition and its roles, we will better understand the Thai political situation and predict its development in the future in a more precise manner.

Review of Literature

After an initial overview of related work, we examine specific prior work on the Ombudsman of Thailand. Work in this area has three main fields; firstly, on the legal status, secondly on the difficulties of exercising power, and thirdly on the user satisfaction.

Examples of the work on the field of legal status are "The Problems of Legal Status and Authority of Ombudsman Under The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand" by Siriya Promradyod, and "Conflicts Between Decisions of The Office of The Ombudsman and The Judgments of The Central Administrative Court: A Study of Disputes on the Issuance of Title Documents (Title Deeds) in Khok Kloi Subdistrict, Takua Thung District, Phang-Nga Province "by Orawan Kongthed. Where "The Ombudsman Complaint Investigation Process" by Nurumon Pocham and "Opinions of Operation Officials of Office of The Ombudsman Thailand Towards Problems and Obstacles for the Receipt of Complaints from Reporters" by Rosarin Tomorn focus on the issue of exercising power. For the work on people's satisfaction, "People's Satisfaction on the Services of The Ombudsman Office" by Rathasit Koprayoon is one of the good examples. These researches have significant contributions focusing on law and social service, with less concern in studying the significance of a political system under Thai politics in which our paper will cover.

The Hierarchical Position of the Ombudsman Office under the Constitution of Thailand




Figure 1: The hierarchy of the organizations in the Thai Constitution.

As we can see from the figure, there are five independent organizations under the Thai Constitution, and the Ombudsman Thailand is one of them. The Ombudsman of Thailand is independent in the sense that it is established outside of the law; Executive and judicial branches. Therefore, there is no need to report to a senior official within the executive branch, such as the Prime Minister. The other characteristic of the Ombudsman Thailand is that the chief officer has protection from deportation and is therefore isolated from political interference by the prime minister or other elected officials.

The Ombudsman Thailand works independently, and they have the power to "recommend the relevant State agencies to revise any law, rule, regulations, rules or order or any operative procedure that causes grievance or unfairness or imposes an unnecessary or undue burden on the people." However, to prevent overlapping power with the judicial system, the ombudsman office has no power to interpret the Constitution and laws and apply their interpretations to the controversies submitted to it, thus weakening the Ombudsman's function. For example, an ombudsman can refer a matter to the Constitutional Court or the Administrative Court; if a legal provision raises the question of constitutionality, the matter shall be referred to the Constitutional Court together with an opinion; the Constitutional Court will examine and decides by the procedural law of the Constitutional Court.

The Organic Structure of the Ombudsman Office




Figure 2: The organic structure of the ombudsman office Thailand. Available at: https://www.ombudsman.go.th/en/organizational_structure.php.

From the figure, we can see that the organic structure of the ombudsman office of Thailand is highly specialized, and specialists are dealing with legal, investigation, information and communication, duties of the states, and public relation, respectively.

The Function of the Ombudsman Thailand

The function of the Ombudsman Thailand is to "Examine the use of state power for ensuring the lasting fairness." in the following ways:

1. Fact-finding investigation for fairly redress grievances of people.
2. Recommendations for state agencies to amend unfair law.
3. Report the implementation under the Constitution Chapter 5 Duties of the State."

Significant Case Analysis

The most significant case that has happened recently could be the strong man of Thailand, Prayuth Chan-Ocha, and his cabinet failed to take their oath of office when they were sworn in at the ceremony in front of King Vajiralongkorn on June 16, 2019.

Mr. Prayuth is the first general to come to power in a 2014 coup to skip the last sentence of the oath of office, which contains a pledge to uphold the Constitution, which is all the more surprising given that it was written by the junta he led. After that, the cabinet ministers must take an oath in which they promise to "be loyal to His Majesty and to honestly carry out my duties for the good of the country and the people. I will also uphold and obey the Constitution of the Kingdom in all respects."

Mr. Prayuth has tried to dismiss the incident as unimportant and the criticism disproportionate. However, opinion polls suggest that discomfort about the oath debacle is widespread. The people lodged complaints with the Ombudsman's office, claiming that if the oath were incomplete, the government would be illegitimate, and its actions should be declared null and void. The Ombudsman accepted the complaint, considered the swearing incomplete, and referred to the Constitutional Court.

On September 19, 2019, the Constitutional Court overturned all charges against Mr. Prayuth for the following reason:

The oath-taking ceremony conducted just before the government took office was merely a formal activity between the oath takers, namely the prime minister and his cabinet ministers, and the monarch, on which no other agency was legally obliged to judge.

The timeline of the events are as follows:

1. July 16, 2019: Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and 35 Cabinet ministers pledged their loyalty to King Maha Vajiralongkorn at a ceremony but omitted the last sentence on upholding and complying with the Constitution.
2. August 5, 2019, 2 activists made complaints focused on the actual recitation of the oath to the Ombudsman Office.
3. August 8, 2019: On August 8, Mr. Prayut said he took full responsibility for the omission and apologized.
4. August 20, 2019, a Ramkhamhaeng University student complained to the Ombudsman Office that the incomplete oath affects the government's ability to benefit the people.
5. August 27, 2019 Members of the Ombudsman meet in Bangkok to consider the cabinet's swearing-in complaints. The Ombudsman has ruled that the prime minister's failure to recite a key sentence in his oath of office was unconstitutional and will refer the matter to the Constitutional Court to rule on whether the government is legally installed.
6. September 11, 2019, Thailand's Constitutional Court judges reached the unanimous resolution to lift the charges against Prayut.

Conclusion

This paper has the following finding, Firstly, to make a complaint to the Ombudsman Thailand is simple, and with multi-channels, this will make the ombudsman office create a closer relationship with the people. Secondly, in the case of the cabinet's incomplete swearing-in, the Ombudsman office takes action according to their duty by not considering the power and political influences of the prime minister. As a result, more support from the people was gained. Thirdly, the Ombudsman cannot initiate an investigation unless they receive complaints from the people; this shows that the primary function of the Ombudsman is to redress the grievances of the people. So forth, the Ombudsman has no power to rule on their resolution has weakened its function, and we also found that the ombudsman system will help stabilize the political situation in Thailand.

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COVID-19 and Its Implications on International Trade Relations and Global Legal Order

R.P.D.N. Ranasinghe^{1,2}

¹University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka

²NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, India

Abstract

The COVID -19 pandemic becomes a worldwide fitness crisis and revolutionized the manner we had long gone approximately engaging in our lives. The governments of various countries undertook numerous measures that allow to control virus from spreading, consisting of declaration of lockdown and maintaining social distance. Ultimately, its evolution into a worldwide crisis not solely noncontiguous the economy however additional modified a nation's perceptions of the world order. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic rakes basics problems such as how the pandemic will influence the international order in the future, how the pandemic might reshape the world order, which in turn will affect the prospects for international cooperation. The main research objective is to examine the international impact of COVID-19 in legal order and trade affairs. In addition, the impact of the pandemic on Asian nations will be discussed in relation to the Sri Lankan situation. This highlights some of the identified and perceived impact of the COVID-19 crisis on development aspect interconnected with the international trade sector, with a particular emphasis on the impact on the production and trade of different products. It proposes a series of recommendations as a basis for policy development in the aftermath of crisis, and highlights potential opportunities to leverage the progress achieved so far, to ensure that decades of advances are not reversed. This article is important because it provides researchers, policymakers, and academics, as well as development practitioners and students, with further knowledge on the paradigm for policymaking, decision-making, and future research. Reports from the United Nations served as guidance for the study. Secondary data was gathered through reviewing relevant publications on the internet, such as papers, theses, conference presentations, and other documents. The materials were discovered using a combination of keyword and phrase searches related to the issue.

Keywords: COVID 19, Pandemic, International, Legal Order, Local.

1. Introduction

The COVID -19 pandemic becomes a global concern from the beginning, and the World Health Organization declared an international public health emergency on January 30, 2020. It's turned into a global health catastrophe, and it's changed the way we go about living our lives. The governments of various countries used a variety of tactics to prevent the virus from spreading, including declaring a state of emergency and preserving social isolation, which has been deemed the most difficult challenge humanity has ever faced since Second World War. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic raises basic questions about how the pandemic will influence the international order in the future, as well as how the virus may modify the world order, influencing international collaboration opportunities. The probable impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international trade relations and the global legal system is the emphasis of this research. It examines the international and domestic legal frameworks, with a particular focus on Asian countries. It offers a set of ideas for policymakers to consider in the aftermath of a disaster.

There are several caveats to this paper's coverage. To begin with, this does not give a thorough evaluation of all relevant actions and initiatives that may aid in a better understanding of COVID-19's influence on the world legal system as it relates to international trade relations. Instead, it focuses on a few activities and programs that have been chosen based on their importance and other characteristics.

Second, the entire impact of COVID-19 will not be known for some time, policies and actions are changing in response to the growing pandemic, and the report effectively provides a snapshot in time for many of the listed activities.

The methodology adopted for the study is completely doctrinal, and it includes content analysis. Primary sources were reviewed for the document analysis, which included international treaties, legislation, and court judgments. The approach utilized in producing this research is the collecting of secondary data in the form of books, journal articles, and information media that are developing and current in the community during the COVID-19 pandemic.

2. International Legal Framework with Respect to the International Trade Relations

International trade law is a system of laws and agreements that govern international trade. International trade laws lay forth the rules that governments and businesses must follow when transacting across borders. The law of international commerce is based on both international and domestic laws of the countries involved. The origins of International Law are the processes through which laws are found or produced. However, there hasn't been a formalized system to identify what sources of international trade law are. The form of trade that moves the global economy ahead is known as international commerce. Demand and supply, as well as pricing, are affected by global events. Global commerce benefits countries and consumers by exposing them to services and goods that are not available in their own country. (Michael, 2017) Because of international economic links, developing countries may make better use of their resources, technology, knowledge, money, and labor. By allowing different countries to participate in the global economy, global commerce fosters foreign direct investment. These individuals invest in foreign firms and other assets.

The COVID-19 pandemic has damaged international trade and heightened geopolitical tensions, leading a UN Security Council resolution asking for a global cease-fire. Some suggest that the pandemic requires a thorough reconsideration of present methods to international affairs, with a greater focus on health diplomacy, crisis politics, and border politics. Apart from pandemics, difficulties over drug trafficking and transit, medical testing, and hospital supplies for coronavirus disease have damaged diplomatic relations.

Developing countries in Latin America and Africa are unable to secure sufficient money for coronavirus vaccine development due to outspending by the United States and European nations. With China leading the way, the United States is the world's most important center for diplomatic, fiscal, technical, and cultural relations. The disease in China put the global "real" economy and supply lines in danger, while the pandemic hit Italy and the United Kingdom badly. It also has a detrimental influence on nations in Asia and Africa. As a result, we may conclude that this pandemic will have a considerable influence on global trade connections.

3. Global Legal Order

Theorizing the global legal order is a bold undertaking that goes beyond standard normative attempts to bind legal principles and institutions together. The international legal order governs not only how international law becomes binding law inside a specific state, but also the connection between the various state entities engaged in the application of international law. Sovereign nations are bound by the agreements they enter into, as well as principles of customary international law and *jus cogens*, to the degree that they are prepared to acknowledge and adhere by global legal commitments. (Lindahl, 2018)

Whether international law is directly binding or requires implementing legislation depends on the domestic constitutional system, as well as whether international law or the home constitution takes precedence. The majority of governments want to follow the rules of international law in good faith. Because sovereign states are governed by international law.

The Covid-19 virus, which has brought global legal order to a halt, has thrown the world's economic system to a halt. As a result, the world's economic relations, particularly marine trade, have suffered. Migrant employees were compelled to leave due to horrible working conditions; in order to save money, employment cutbacks were undertaken, resulting in a huge number of individuals losing their jobs. (Sadat, 2021) When the current Corona virus spread, it revealed the extent of America's worldwide leadership standing, demonstrating that the US had failed to lead the world's international

order. Many changes will occur as a result of Corona, including the emergence of a new multipolar structure and a speedier transfer of power and influence from the West to Asian nations, particularly China, Singapore, and South Korea. This indicates that the pandemic has a significant impact on global legal order.

4. The Impact Of COVID-19 on International Trade Relations and Global Legal Order

The pandemic interacts with international trade and legal order in a number of ways since it is a global phenomenon. COVID-19 has an impact on globalization, liberalization, urbanization, and a variety of other industries, and many company owners are trying to steer their companies through the virus. Consumers are being pushed to purchase online, which is fueling the growth of e-commerce. Small-scale manufacturers, merchants, and customers in developed and developing nations have begun to adopt e-commerce tactics to reduce losses over time.

As a result, Asian countries have been pushed to use the internet to promote their businesses across the world. The government has also made a variety of initiatives to encourage digital transactions, mobile money transfers, and e-commerce.

The pandemic has sparked a never-before-seen surge in demand for critical infrastructure. This highlights the need of promoting new technology and its use to combat the pandemic through a number of applications, such as population scanning, outbreak monitoring, vaccine development, effective quarantine, and prioritizing.

Many national governments have put limitations on the exportation of medical goods and equipment in response to COVID-19 related shortages or fears of shortages. Personal protective equipment (PPE) is subject to temporary export limitations in the United States, which need prior clearance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Similar regulations have been adopted by the European Union to prevent the export of certain healthcare goods outside of the European Single Market. (Jiemian,2020) Exports of COVID-19-related medical goods from China have been regulated rather than forbidden. In addition to the nations already named, the World Customs Organization recognized Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Switzerland as some countries that have enacted some sort of export restrictions. In the literature, short supply restrictions in international commerce have gotten little attention. However, the current rash of COVID-19-related export restrictions has prompted some critical economic analysis. One major concern is that export penalties would elicit retaliation, resulting in a distorted market with broad trade obstacles to essential supplies.

Countries with limited capabilities to manufacture their own medical supplies may face extremely high prices as a result of restrictions. (Levin ,2020.) Restriction may potentially disrupt global supply networks, causing shortages of vital input materials for critical downstream suppliers and driving supply chain restructuring with less efficient manufacturers, depending on the circumstances. Governments and people may panic purchase and hoard as a result of the restrictions, increasing price increases caused by the first scarcity.

Prior to the pandemic, important medical supplies were produced in a competitive market that was disseminated across many nations. Prices are competitively determined based on production costs, and supplies are enough for anticipated demands. The pandemic has caught everyone off guard, resulting in a surge in global demand for certain medical therapies. Because prices are not allowed to increase to clear markets, real rationing develops. Article XI of the GATT forbids export restrictions "other than tariffs, taxes, or alternative charges." If not for exceptions to the current prohibitions on medical provider exports during the pandemic, article XI would be violated.

Article XX(b) authorizes 'necessary to protect human health' measures as long as they don't imply 'absolute or unjustifiable discrimination between countries.' This clause is most commonly used to defend import limits on product that is believed to pose a risk, but it can also be used to explain a deviation from Article XI's export limitations probation. There's no doubt that measures would be attempted to conceal export limitations on medical professionals during a pandemic. Article XX(j) provides an additional exception for measures "necessary to the acquisition or distribution of merchandise in a normal or native short supply," subject to an equivalent condition on top of the additional condition that such measures be consistent with the principle that all catching parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such trade. It also gives a plausible argument

for export restrictions on limited medical supplies. These limits are nothing new; trade agreements allow for them in particular exceptions to treaty commitments, such as where public health is at risk.

Despite being economically inefficient, these provisions will support long-term trade agreement stability by providing national governments with a "escape mechanism" in the event that domestic political pressure might otherwise lead to longer-term breaches or abandonment of treaty obligations. The aviation industry, on the other hand, was the most hit. Many governments have chosen to halt airline operations and international flights, resulting in enormous losses for both airlines and the tourism sector. Another area that has been harmed is the corporate sector, which has seen smaller enterprises forced to close their doors. As a result, several South Asian countries that rely on tourism have suffered.

Questions have been raised regarding whether China's government did enough to stop the COVID virus from spreading and how it should be held accountable. (Kraska, 2020) Human rights are under danger during the crisis, with an unprecedented number of countries violating international civil and political rights accords. Some authoritarian administrations have used the crisis as an excuse to consolidate authority and suppress opposition. In addition to its numerous negative implications, the pandemic may have some positive outcomes. Immediately, air quality has improved in many countries as a result of a significant reduction in the usage of fossil fuels. If some of these reductions become permanent, they may help to address not only pollution but also the growing challenge of climate change. This is only one illustration of how the pandemic might prompt people to reconsider prior approaches to cross-border issues or propose new forms of intergovernmental collaboration.

Covid-19 is a sneaky virus that takes a long time to infect and spreads quickly. The world's two largest economies, China and the United States, were the epicenters of the global pandemic. It is hard to predict the long-term consequences of this crisis, such as changes in international laws and organizations. Some changes are transient, while others are long-term. As the new coronavirus outbreak spreads over the world, international institutions appear to have lost some of their importance and usefulness. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council failed to hold a virtual summit on viral response cooperation. The G-20 and G-7 have been unable to make even the most fundamental choices on global economic recovery. The global health crisis has shown a lack of international cooperation, with governments closing in on themselves, or "selfish closure," as French sociologist Edgar Morin put it. Another worrisome trend arising in the midst of the pandemic is the "brutal" economic globalization that defines the US-China trade war.

5. Domestic Impact of COVID-19 on Trade Relations and Domestic Legal Order

This will take into account the legal implications of Covid-19 in Sri Lanka, as well as government decrees, notifications, and the activities of other regulatory authorities in limiting Covid-19 influence on commercial relations. Sri Lanka's economy was still struggling when the COVID-19 pandemic struck in March 2020. The Easter Sunday attacks in 2019 had a significant impact on the economy, resulting in a record low growth rate in 2019. COVID-19 is now hurting the majority of economic sectors, causing havoc with trade surpluses and balances of payments.

The COVID-19 outbreak has wreaked havoc on the world economy, resulting in a global recession. Traditional limits on commercial activity mobility, consumer markets compression, and economic resource supply chain closure have bought time for anti-pandemic actions, but they have a detrimental impact on economic development in general. The impact of the pandemic on agriculture is comparable to what has been observed in other nations in the area. Despite the government's efforts to protect agricultural supply networks, an estimated 2.1 million agricultural families face extinction.

More strong efforts are needed to keep food supply chains intact and reduce the repercussions across the food system. Agricultural operations and food supply chains were initially exempt from the lockdown, but compliance concerns caused substantial labor shortages and a price crash in wholesale markets. The government started a scheme to purchase fruits and vegetables directly from farmers in response to the situation. Agricultural employment accounts for around 30% of Sri Lanka's workforce, despite the sector's contribution to GDP being as low as 10%. The most important food crop in Sri Lanka is rice, which is followed by the plantation crop market, which comprises tea, rubber, and coconut. Poor growth, inefficient water and land use, and substantial post-harvest losses have plagued the industry for a long time. Climate change and natural catastrophes have had an impact on Sri Lanka's

agriculture industry, which ranks second in the Global Climate Risk Index. Farmers, on the other hand, have been urged to switch to climate-smart farming as a result on this.

Every industry has been influenced by COVID-19. Travel, tourism, entertainment, the hotel industry, steel, textiles, and other businesses have all suffered significant losses. Food and beverage, paper, medicines, and heavy machinery and equipment have all done well. Several sectors in Sri Lanka are now experiencing challenges as a result of international trade and tourism uncertainty. Tourist arrivals in Sri Lanka dropped 17.7% in February compared to the same month the previous year, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. The coronavirus global effect has had a negative influence on Sri Lanka's tea sector.

A constant reorganization has begun as a result of business globalization. Words like downsizing, restructuring, and reconfiguration are often used to characterize the current state of affairs across all industries. The impact of the Coronavirus on global financial market conditions has harmed Sri Lanka's abroad investments. The outstanding balance of foreigners' T-bills and T-bonds has declined by 9.03 percent, or 8.236 billion rupees, bringing the total amount of foreign outflows in the past two weeks to 19.6 billion rupees.

6. Conclusion

In general, we can identify a number of issues relating to international economic relations and global legal system that have arisen as a result of the pandemic. Today, we are in danger. As a result of the public health issue, unpredictable events occur that we cannot forecast. Specifically, there was an economic effect on international relations that impacted the global economy, causing supply chains and economic ties to be disrupted. COVID-19 has had a significant impact on this area. We are witnessing a rise in global nationalism and isolation, which is having a growing influence on both developed and developing nations. The crisis has had the greatest impact on Asia's developing countries, such as Sri Lanka.

There were international affairs before the first and second world wars. Although the League of Nations was unable to prevent World War II, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN) have been active in attaining its objectives. Is it a success? We also have administrative structures and other entities, the majority of which are WTO-affiliated. The legal system as it stands now, as well as the coordination of activities and how these multilateral mechanisms work.

As a consequence, COVID-19's one-year experience will teach us a lot. We'll recognize a few concepts based on certain scenarios that will help us deal with a similar issue. To begin, we must acknowledge and reward effective global governance institutions that value and support innovative technologies, scientific and health-related experiments, multilateral cooperation, and scientific technology and governance procedures. COVID diplomacy heralds the dawn of a new era in diplomacy. The United Nations and international institutions must be protected, as must the ideals of dominance over democracy, sovereignty, and non-interference. As a result, the pandemic highlights the need to reconsider the role of economic liberalization in connection to other long-term values.

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Repeating Ineffectiveness: The Strategy of Eradicating Bribery in The Jokowi Administration

Sri Yunanto¹, Angel Damayanti² and Evi Satispi¹

¹Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta, Indonesia

²Universitas Kristen Indonesia, Indonesia

Abstract

Bribery has been rampant in Indonesia since the kingdom and colonial era. It has become a severe impediment to implement good governance, specifically in promoting satisfactory public services. Hence, the Indonesian government has adopted various strategies to combat bribery from the Old Order to the reformation era. Some of these strategies have applied the system of eradicating bribery in annihilating corruption. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the Jokowi administration's approach in eliminating the prevalence of bribery, mainly coordinated by Satgas Saber Pungli/SSP (The Bribery Eradication Task Force). A qualitative method was employed, and the data were obtained from primary resources, such as documents, news and interviews, as well as secondary resources. Moreover, this article utilized the principal-agent theoretical framework and concluded that Jokowi's strategy in combating bribery was ineffective. It repeated the ineffectiveness of strategies for eradicating bribery adopted by the Indonesian governments preceding Jokowi.

Keywords: *Bribery, Strategy, Ineffective, Jokowi, Government, Rampant.*

Background

Bribery in Indonesia has long been practiced by public authorities since the colonial and reform era (Moerdijat, 2019). Accordingly, the Indonesian government adopted strategies to deal with bribery problems in these periods although it was not successful. As a result, bribery practices are still rampant in all social and governmental agencies. Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Jusuf Kalla (JK), who succeeded SBY-Boediono in the first period (2014-2019) believe that the deterioration of the national economy is partly due to the general practices of bribery, hence, the government should eradicate it seriously and consistently (Jokowi and JK, 2014).

Jokowi and JK, who came to power in 2014, inherited rampant bribery practices from their preceding governments. They established Bribery Eradication Taskforce (Satuan Tugas Sapu Bersih Pungli (Satgas Saber Pungli/ SSP). This study aims to analyze the Jokowi administration's strategy in eradicating bribery. It seeks to evaluate the implementation strategy at the central and local government levels and highlights its explanation. The hypothesis shows that it has been ineffective as the previous government's strategy. In conclusion, to get a more comprehensive portrayal, it was compared with bribery eradication strategies adopted by the preceding governments

Legal and Theoretical Frameworks

Article 12 of the law No. 20/2001 on corruption eradication defines *bribery* as a part of corruption or petty corruption, such as the acts that civil servants commit to benefit themselves or others by violating laws, abusing power, and forcing people to pay, receive discounts or do something for them. Kumorotomo (2016) defined bribery from the perspective of public service mismanagement., that is "grease money" usually collected by officers at the operational level in relatively small amounts, to ease or accelerate public services. This study combines definition stipulated in Law no 20/2001 and that of Kumorotomo. This study defined *strategy* as the instruments to achieve long-term institutional goals, following up on programs and resource allocation (Chandler in Rangkuti, 2013). Subsequently, the Indonesian government has adopted a series of strategies since the Old Order to reform period in eradicating rampant bribery.

This study borrowed the principal-agent model of corruption developed by Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Robert Klitgaard (1988), to explain the ineffective strategy of combating bribery in the Jokowi period or the preceding administrations. The theory assumed that crime occurs due to missions clash between the principal or rulers representing public interests and the agent in terms of bureaucrats or public servants who receive mandates from the principal. This principal-agents model indicates that the in-effective corruption eradication strategy emphasizes narrowing the agent's opportunities to avoid corruption practice by making regulation that increases accountability, limits both discretionary authority and the monopoly of the agents. Conversely, Ackerman and Klitgaard suggest that corruption [including bribery] eradication strategy should be approached from rational action theory, that is, providing attractive rational benefits for the actions of the public who report and punish corrupt behavior and distance themselves from corrupt attitudes (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010.).

Methodology

This study utilized a qualitative approach that employed data collection methods from primary to secondary resources. Primary resources consist of data obtained from monthly and annual reports, standard operation procedures, as well as minutes of the meeting issued by the SSP, offline and online news sources. In addition, this study also employed data from secondary sources such as a report by the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI) or Transparency International (TI), as well as books and journals which discussed various public service problems, including bribery practices.

The Ineffective Strategy of Jokowi Administration in Eradicating Bribery

Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla, who succeeded Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono/SBY-Boediono in the first period (2014-2019), inherited the rampant practice of bribery from their predecessors. According to Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI), bribery practices are rampant in almost all government institutions in the early years of their administration (2015 and 2016). In 2015, the ORI received 384 bribery reports, and the number increased by 13% or 434 in 2016. In 2016 or about a year of the Jokowi administration, ORI mapped out the bribery practices in governmental sectors or institutions including; ministry of education, Land, Law enforcement, citizenship administration, tax and customs, transportation, personnels, permit license, health and other and governmental institutions. The perpetrators who were government officials took IDR 25 to 30 trillion of public money. This practice has hampered the realization of economic development, especially in investment, and has become one of the leading causes of the national economy (ORI, 2018; SSP 2019).

Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Jusuf Kalla (JK) promised a series of political platforms known as Nawacita I to attract their constituencies. To seriously and consistently eradicate bribery, in 2016, Jokowi issued Presidential Regulation number 87/2016, which enacted the establishment of Satuan Tugas Saber Pungli/SSP (The Bribery Eradication Taskforce). The mission of the taskforce is developing a bribery prevention system, collecting data of bribery practices coordinating and planning bribery eradication operations, carrying out field arrest operations (Operasi Tangkap Tangan/OTT), and recommending the government institution penalties to the bribers (article 4). In realizing the mission, presidential regulation enacts the government institutions from central and local levels to form Units for Eradicating Bribery (Unit Pemberantasan Pungli/UPP) organized in the inspectorate divisions.

The SSP strategy focused on the abuse of power that impedes the realization of transparent, rational or accountable public services and makes the loss of public's fund and jeopardizes public services. This strategy was placed as one of the five priorities in the law reform that tackle problems in public services, including those issuing the driving license, electronic citizenship, land title, the procurement of goods and services, and other permits with high cost, red-tape, and inefficiency. Using the frameworks of Ackerman and Klitgaard's principal and agent theory, Jokowi's strategy seeks to limit the agent's or public servant opportunities from committing bribery by making Presidential Regulation number 87/2016 on the Establishment of SSP. The decree aims to increase public service accountability and limit the civil servant's discretionary authority or monopoly in delivering services to the people. The SSP adopts three techniques to eradicate bribery; preemption, prevention and law enforcement of repression. The preemption technique takes the form data collection on bribery practices. The prevention includes developing prevention system, socialization, developing IT and improving the quality of public

services. The repression or law enforcement technique includes providing recommendation of the sanction, partnershi with othe government institution, Field Arrest Operation (OTT) (SSP, 2016).

Even though the implementation of the strategies produced significant outputs, Jokowi's strategy in combating bribery was ineffective as it failed to achieve the vision of liberating public services from bribery. Consequently, it was unable to promote clean governance with efficient public services. Following evidences support the theses. In 2017 or a year after the establishment of SSP in 2016, Transparency International (TI) and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released its survey, which stated that 90% of Indonesian government officials admitted that they expected bribes from the public. In 2019-2020, three years after establishing SSP, TI released another survey that 30% of the public who demanded services from the government paid bribes to the officers at the central and local levels (Lidyana, 2020). These results were in line with grass-root practice. From 2017 to 2021 bribery were rampantly practiced in Harbour services, land transport service education and emergency service areas that deal with the 2020 Covid 19 Outbreak. In the loading and unloading service. SSP Operation Officers had arrested Bribers in Samarinda Harbour (2017) and Bitung North Sulawesi Harbour (2018) Teluk Bayur West Sumatera (2020). Bribery in land transport (2019) have even been considered as worse compared to the New Order era because the government personnel involved in bribes openly and broadly (Gumilang, 2017). (Jonker, 2018 Tim Media SSP, 2020) Wage, Sukarno and Sari, 2019).

Agung Makbul, a secretary of SSP stated that in 2020, or four year after the formation of SSP, the taskforce had mapped out 20 areas that were prone to bribery practices in the department of education. In the emergency service area to deal with Covid 19 Outbreak, Bribery were also practiced in several sectors including the victims' funeral in Malang East Java, distribution of social assistance funds, issuing anti-gent rapid test service of South Lampung, Lampung Province (Tim Media SSP 2020, 2021). The above-mentioned evidence is in line with the decline of the Corruption perception during Jokowi Time, that was from 40 in 2019 to 37 in 2020. This was due to weak Jokowi's political will (Suchahyo, 2020; Ramadhan, A 2021) Dzulfaroh,A.N, 2021) . This study discovered several external factors that explain the Jokowi strategy's ineffectiveness in combating bribery, such as poor service standardization or lack of transparency in the reporting, internal and external challenges posed by SSP as found Ombudsman RI (2021) (Safitri, 2019). The internal factor mostly come from the administration and management of SSP which causes the in-effectiveness of their implementation This comes along with legal, institutional, administrative and media challenges that SSP pose since its establishment.


Repeating Ineffectiveness

The ineffectiveness of the Jokowi strategy was gradual as it repeated the system of the predecessor's government. No much information on the Old Order Policy to combat bribery, except that the corruption eradication teams such as PARAN and Budhi failed to bring the bribers and corruptors to justice as they sought Sukarno's political protection (Suwitri, 2007). This situation left the New Order with rampant corruption and bribery practices. Suharto adopted a more focused strategy in combating bribery when in 1967, he established Operasi Tertib/Opstib (The Order Operation), separating from Polri and the Attorney General's method of corruption eradication (Farihi, 2018; Arleta, 2019) and Operasi Sihwa and Opersai Tuntan (Lindsay, 2004). However, several operations by Suharto were fruitless as well. Suharto;s failure in the corruption and bribery eradication sparked student demonstrations in 1969-1970. Suharto's political will was weak and failed to clean up the inner cycles, therefore, pulling down the administration (Moerdijat, 2019). Until the end of the New Order administration, corruption and bribery were rampant in government offices (acch.kpk.go.id 2017). Suharto's political will was weak and failed to clean up the inner cycles, therefore, pulling down the administration (Moerdijat, 2019).

This study found no specific measurement of the ineffectiveness strategy for combating bribery in the four administrations preceding Jokowi during the reform period, namely, BJ Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. This was because they did not adopt strategies or establish specific institutions to combat bribery separating from law enforcement institutions like the New Order and Jokowi administrations did. Instead, they applied the strategy of combating bribery in corruption eradication. Since the four administrations during the reform period did not adopt a different technique to combat bribery or corruption, the effectiveness level of the implementation in bribery eradication strategy should be analyzed from the corruption eradication strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly observe bribery eradication from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

achievement. The graph below showed the levels of corruption eradication in the four governments preceding Jokowi's administration, which arguably include bribery eradication as petty corruption. (Graph 1).

Graph 1: Indonesia's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in The Reformation Era (1998-2014).



The graph shows that the Indonesia's CPI increases slowly during the reform period (1998-2014). Indonesia's CPI was very poor at the outset of the reform period. The three governments in this period could not improve Indonesia's performance in eradicating corruption inherited from the New Order. The CPI scores on Habibie (1998-1999), Gus Dur (1999-2001), and Megawati (2001-2004) administrations were between 19-20 and declined to 17 during Gus Dur's administration. However, this value increased significantly during the two terms or 10 years of SBY's administration (2004-2014), with a score of 20 to 34, from the beginning (2004) to the end (2014) of the administration respectively. During this period, Indonesia's corruption perception index score increased by 14 points. BJ Habibi and Gus Dur and Megawati did not put a focus in the bribery eradication. In 2005 Yudhoyono's administration received complaints and critiques for its poor eradication of bribery for not taking no concrete measures that responded to complaints, albeit rhetoric. According to Zainal Arifin Muhtar, SBY-JK's (2004-2009) strategy was ineffectively stagnant and weakened drastically. This was due to the poor performance of law enforcement agencies, such as Polri, the Attorney General's office and KPK (Kumrotomo, 2016; bgs/djo news.detik.com 2009 and liputan 6.com, 2007).

Conclusion & Recommendation

This study concluded that Jokowi's strategy in eradicating bribery by establishing SSP, is similar to the New Order, yet differs from those adopted by the Old Order and the four regimes preceding Jokowi in the reform period. Implementing the strategy for eradicating bribery and corruption during Jokowi's tenure was ineffective as it was a repetition of the predecessors' system. This study revealed service standardization, internal and external challenges posed by SSP, which explained such ineffectiveness. It was the results from reforming the legal instrument and establishing an institution that eliminates corruption or bribery. The strategies confirmed the principle-agent theory by Ackerman and Klitgaard, which emphasized narrowing agent's or public official's opportunity to avoid corruption or bribery, and making regulation that increases accountability, limits discretionary authority, and the agents' monopoly. The principle-agent theory confirmed that the strategy failed to eradicate corruption and bribery. This study recommends that bribery eradicating policy and strategy should not only rely on the legal reform and the establishment of new institutions. The corruption [including bribery]

eradicating strategy should reward social organizations which mobilize the public to report and punish corrupt behavior and to distance from corrupt attitudes.

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Television in Japan: The Enduring Gaze?

Sebastian Brooke

Kogakuin University, Tokyo, Japan

Abstract

Japan is a land of screens, from the large, billboard-sized public screens promoting the latest musical talent in the trendy areas of Shibuya and Shinjuku, to the brand-name, digital, flat-screen televisions to be found in every house and apartment throughout the country. Television connects all 126 million inhabitants, with extremely high levels of saturation and viewing time, even in the face of competing media channels and platforms. This paper investigates television broadcasting history in Japan from its humble beginnings to its current levels of saturation, to understand this phenomenon of almost 80 percent of homes tuned in to television screens (NHK, 2021), even as other media channels try to chip away at television's dominance and younger audiences rapidly move away from television and to the internet. Is this enduring gaze, however, coming to an end, as surveys show television viewing becoming fractured along generational lines?.

Keywords: Japan, Television, Media.

Introduction

Digital broadcasting and the rapid growth of high-speed Internet connections has seen pixelated screens become central to the life experience of Japanese young and old, in both the super-modern cities and the rapidly shrinking countryside. 79 percent of the population of Japan can be found in front of their television screens on weekday evenings and Sundays (NHK, 2021), a figure that has started a steady decline over the last ten years, from 89% in 2010. It is virtually impossible to escape the worlds of the screens in any way in modern Japan, meaning it is also impossible to escape the manufactured content on these screens. As Wakamiya, Lee & Sumiya (2011) put it, 'we can watch almost anything we want at any time and from anywhere we want to' (p. 39).

The driving force behind this promulgation of screens across the country, in barber shops, nursing homes, living rooms, kitchens, hospital waiting rooms, is at its most basic level a self-promotion, a need to perpetuate consumerism and brandism, to ensure that screens continue to be bought and continue to integrate into everyday life, providing a direct conduit between products and consumers. These products range from the television screens themselves, everyday consumer goods, through to opinions and worldviews, selections and slices of life for consumption by audiences eager to absorb and consume and connect. The form these products are delivered in varies between advertising in its traditional, commercial form, and television programming content, although perhaps more so in the case of Japan than elsewhere, the line between these two is often blurred, with sponsorship deals and advertising companies involved in programme creation and content selection. Kawashima (2006) explains this cosy relationship between the television stations, which traditionally provide the content, and the agencies who supply advertisers but also programme content ideas, as a case of 'being close to the national networks' key stations in Tokyo, the agencies sometimes propose new programmes to them with possible lists of sponsors' (p. 400). Commercial interests are undoubtedly drivers however, not simply practical geography.

The world of television is a major factor in everyday life in Japan, with almost one television set for every person in Japan, 'at around 120 million' sets nationwide for a population of approximately 126 million (Nippon Television Network, 2011, p. 68). This almost total spread and coverage is also supported by the very high contact hours citizens have with this medium, hours that have however shown a decline over the past ten years, dropping from a high of 3 hours 28 minutes on weekdays and over 4 hours on Sundays in 2010, to 3 hours 1 minute on weekdays in 2020 (NHK, 2021). The enduring

gaze and viewership that has defined the Japanese television experience is fracturing, fracturing both due to changes in the consumption of technology, but also because of stagnation in content programming. The COVID-19 pandemic has once again, like the earthquake and tsunami of 2011, seen Japanese rushing to their television screens for news, information, and entertainment, but these numbers are receding in clear numbers and even clearer demographic groupings.

Television in Japan developed from a nationally controlled radio network, and, as it did in so many countries, television modelled itself upon radio broadcasting initially, both in terms of programming content and in its function as a national entity, appealing to a wide, national audience. Television has come a long way from the early days of NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai) or the Tokyo Broadcasting Station as it was known in its earlier incarnation as a radio broadcaster, with both regular public and private television broadcasting beginning in the 1950s. The connections between radio and television, and also print media companies, remain strong however, with a small group of media organisations, the ‘information cartels’ (Freeman, 2000, p. 4), virtually monopolising all three traditional mediums - print, radio and television - while today increasingly moving into the rapidly growing world of online media. As the *Sugata Research* group state, however, ‘television will, of course, not disappear but the increasing competition online via streaming services will continue to accelerate’ (Sugata Research, 2015).

Japan is a nation of media consumers, a nation of television screens switched on, flickering their images and messages into the homes of viewers sitting in front of their screens for hours each day. Although viewing rates and consumption hours are on the decline, television is still today, as Yoshimi (2003) described it, central to daily life in Japan:

Even today, Japanese people watch on average more than three hours per day, making it the second largest use of their time after sleeping. TV forms a major part of the lives of people all over the world, but it is above all in Japan that it has come to play such a central role in the culture of daily life, besides simply being a major source of influence. ... 23 percent of Japanese surveyed placed TV at the top of a list of items deemed necessary for daily life. This figure is 4.6 times greater than for Americans (5 percent), 2.3 times greater than for the French (10 percent) and close to double the figure obtained among people surveyed in Thailand (13 percent). From an international comparative perspective, few nations attach as much importance to TV as do the Japanese. (Yoshimi, 2003, p. 460)

History of Broadcast Media in Japan

Print media, in the form of newspapers, arrived relatively late in Japan from an international comparative perspective, and interestingly, the first newspaper came out in English, in 1861, followed fairly quickly by ‘the first Japanese language newspaper’ in 1862 (Moeran, 1996, p. 7). There was no ‘daily paper’ however until the arrival in 1871 of the *Yokohama Mainichi* (Moeran, 1996, p. 7). Radio broadcasting in Japan began life as a public, government-funded entity, known as the Tokyo Broadcasting Station, the predecessor of modern-day NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai), with its first broadcasts aired in 1925. This earlier incarnation of the NHK was modeled on Britain’s BBC radio format. During the American occupation after the Pacific war, further development of radio broadcasting took place, and then the television system and network, utilizing the established monopoly of the national radio broadcaster, NHK.

Today there is a combination of public service broadcasting by NHK, and private, commercial broadcasting by a range of organisations, most of them connected to, supported, and managed by, traditional print media organisations. The following table shows the connections between Japan’s major newspaper companies and television stations:

Table 1: Newspapers and Television Stations – Group Connections (Dentsu, 2016, p. 10).

Sankei News	Mainichi News	Yomiuri News	Asahi News	Nihon Keizai	Kobe News
Fuji TV	TBS	Nihon TV	TV Asahi	TV Tokyo	Sun TV

These newspaper groups were largely responsible for the development of private television programming in Japan, beginning in the 1950s and growing from there, in part to broadcast such national highlights and events as the wedding of Emperor Akihito in 1959 and Tokyo's hosting of the Olympic Games in 1964. Such events helped spur on the development of television technology, increase domestic television set ownership, as well as lead to changes and advances in programming content and associated advertising. The 2020 (held in 2021) Tokyo Olympic Games also drew a large audience, with viewership "averaging 56.4% in the capital and its surrounding areas, the highest for the event since the previous Tokyo Olympics in 1964" (Kyodo, 2021).

From its beginnings with a mountain-top radio broadcast of Beethoven and classical Japanese music, to the millions of people watching the latest baseball game or variety show on their mobile phones, broadcasting in Japan has certainly come a long way. Television broadcasting and the viewing experience has moved from an outdoor, communal experience when television was first introduced in the 1950s in Japan, through to the domestication period that started in the 1960s, of television sets in the home and of the family viewing experience:

By the late 1950s, TV sets were placed not in homes, but on street corners, where large numbers of people gathered. The symbolic meaning of the 'collective' nature of TV changed after the 1960s. From the early 1960s onwards, when TV entered households, it became an overarching medium linking the family with the state, defining the national consciousness and dominating people's imaginative views of both the past and the present. (Yoshimi, 2003, p. 459)

Television has continued to move and adapt, both to keep abreast of technological innovations, but also to fulfill the desires and needs of modern consumers, of individual, on-demand, direct-to-user mobile television devices. Have these technological innovations and developments in the history of broadcasting in Japan been able to move in step with user/consumer requirements, mirroring sociological changes in how television has been consumed in Japan, and how society itself has changed? As has been noted elsewhere internationally, a trend that also is finding resonance in modern Japan:

Young people are increasingly moving away from traditional broadcast television, turning instead to other screens and formats. Such a trend is compelling established media institutions to adapt, to recognise new viewing cultures and disseminate content differently across different platforms. (Hagedoorn, Eichner, & Lozano, 2021, p. 83)

Media Use and Reach

As technology has developed rapidly over the last sixty years, especially communication technologies that support the media industries, so too have audiences changed, in terms of the technologies they prefer, what media they consume, how often, and for what purposes. Across the Japanese population, on average, television viewing rates have dropped from 85% to 79% in just five years from 2015 to 2020, but amongst younger audiences, that drop-in television viewing has been even more dramatic. In the five years from 2015 to 2020, the 16-19-year-old group saw a massive reduction in weekday television, dropping from 71% of that age group watching television on weekdays in 2015, to only 47% five years later in 2020 (NHK, 2021). A strongly connected inverse change in internet use was seen in this age group, with only 47% watching weekday television in 2020, yet now 80% of this group using the internet instead for media consumption (NHK, 2021). The latest survey results from 2020 (NHK, 2021) show the different media forms that Japanese use on a daily basis, with the percentage of users for each media form or medium.

Table 2: Daily Use of Media Forms 2020 - % of population (NHK, 2021).

	Weekdays	Saturdays	Sundays
Television	79%	78%	79%
Newspapers	30%	31%	26%
Internet	20%	21%	21%
Magazines/Comics/Books	14%	17%	16%
Radio	10%	10%	8%

These results show us overwhelmingly that television leads the major mass communication formats being used by Japanese consumers, audiences, and advertisers. Television is a major part of daily life, more so than any other media form, whether newspapers, or even the internet, a somewhat surprising statistic. A breakdown by age groupings of internet usage did find people in their teens, 20s and 30s using the internet more than any other age groupings, with a weekday average of more than two hours, compared to television viewing of just over an hour, up considerably from the approximately one hour internet use in 2010 (NHK, 2021).

Television in Japan

There are five major commercial television channels or stations in metropolis Japan, based in Tokyo, and owned and controlled by the five largest, traditional media organisations, newspaper companies. There is also the publicly-funded broadcaster, NHK, which is free of commercial advertising, and there are also local and independent broadcasting companies. These five major television stations or channels control the world of television broadcasting in Japan, of both programming content, and the advertising that is the lifeblood of the industry. What exactly are Japanese viewers watching on these five major channels daily? The types of television programs being aired are broken down into categories in the yearly research report on Japan's advertising and media industries, *Joho Media Hakusho*, and this media research report found that the greatest number of viewers on an average day are to be found watching sports and game and quiz shows (Dentsu Soken, 2020).

Television in Japan is a diet of sports, news, and 'wideshows', or variety shows, which incorporate an array of different genres and segments. These variety shows usually have their regular presenters, and 'guest' presenters. These guests are commonly known as 'talento' in Japanese, with the irony that they often have no particular 'talent' being lost on most viewers. Just as the Kardashians became famous worldwide for no particular reason, examples of what Rojek (2001) terms 'attributed celebrity', through participation in reality television as 'celeactors', so too do Japan's television guests find fame often through no particular ability or talent. These celebrities 'act in dramas, sing, and appear on television in variety and quiz shows, and also in the commercials in between' (Prieler, Kohlbacher et al., 2010, p. 5). Their lives are, again like the lives of many celebrities around the world, the objects of discussion and fascination, and of television, with audiences following their major life events, which more often than not are televised. There are those of course who have also been teen idols or singers or sports stars earlier in their lives, but there are also a great many who are famous simply in the same way as reality TV stars or 'celeactors' are in other countries, famous for no particular reason or ability, but by having appeared on screen in some segment of some show or reality, slice-of-life programme. These variety shows last from one to several hours each and cover a range of topics and segments, with the presenters and their guests giving their opinions on everything, from national politics and scandals, foreign cultures and peoples, to the best noodle shops in a certain area of Tokyo or Osaka.

However, it seems the content in television programming has not kept pace with the changing viewing desires of the younger generations. It is not just the technology platforms that are driving the younger generation from their television screens and into other worlds of programming. Views, attitudes, and beliefs about social roles and representations are changing but television programming isn't keeping up with these generational shifts. These variety shows display strong gender bias in the fact that the vast majority of the main presenters, and the more popular 'talents', are men. As Saito

(2007) describes it in his study of Japanese television and gender roles, 'television viewing cultivates traditional gender-role attitudes and contributes to the maintenance of the status quo' (2007, p. 511). The reality is that these variety shows, on screen for anywhere from one to three hours at a time, every night, on most channels, still reflect the gender bias that exists in society, and in particular in the higher levels of the worlds of politics and the media:

Only 6% of directors at listed companies in Japan are women, according to government statistics, compared with about a quarter among Fortune 500 companies in the United States. In Japan, almost all come from outside the companies on whose boards they sit. (Dooley, 2021)

NHK, the publicly-funded broadcaster, had five women on its twelve-member Board of Governors in 2012, yet in 2021 only shows four women on the Board. NHK's top management level, the NHK Executive Board, lists eleven men and only one woman:

With just over 13% of its management jobs held by women, Japan barely edges out Saudi Arabia, according to data from the International Labor Organization. (Dooley, 2021)

This is just one example of the disconnect with the younger generation, where surveys show expectations for greater equality, and greater acceptance of non-traditional roles socially and in terms of identity, yet this example of gender power structures does highlight the very real issues that women face in the Japanese media world. It is little surprise then that such gender imbalance at the top levels continues through to the programming content on commercial television channels in Japan, to the people appearing on screen daily, given that the decisions on what and who to show are predominately being made by men, and of at least a generation removed from today's youth who are moving away from the content being produced. Fox (2010) uses the example of *Machiko Maitchingu-Sensei*, an animated cartoon, to discuss how programming content focuses on sex and objectification, for a male audience:

The day-time "wide shows," focus much of their attention on scandalous sex relations and violent or anti-social acts performed by both celebrities and ordinary Japanese, hinting suggestively at their existence when proof cannot be produced. Cartoons for children often feature references to or jokes about sex and scatology. A 1980s cartoon was entitled *Machiko Maitchingu-Sensei* (Machiko, the Giving-in Teacher), about a voluptuously-drawn elementary-school teacher who every week would be groped and fondled by her male students. A current example is the animated cartoon *Crayon-Shin-chan* that features a kindergarten boy whose main interest is adult women. (Fox, 2010, p. 2)

The cartoon series, *Machiko Maitchingu-Sensei*, was also developed into a series of live-action feature films, with the ninth film in this series being released in 2009, showing that such portrayals of women are not limited to the distant past. A 2021 study pointed out that:

'youthification' of television in the contemporary age refers not only to how media creators, scholars and audiences conceptually understand television as a medium continuously reinventing itself, but as a 'strategic focus' to produce content for youth audiences. (Hagedoorn, Eichner, & Lozano, 2021, p. 84)

Young Japanese are moving away from television not simply as a medium change and choice, but also because television programming doesn't reflect their changing views, attitudes and realities. Discussions of the gap-widening society are to be found everywhere, along with discussions of the collapse of the middle-class society that Japan supposedly once was, another driver of generational shift. There is a large, relatively wealthy class of older people and conversely a number of young people facing what Coulmas has called 'uncertain employment prospects' (Coulmas, 2007, p. 11). The changing demographics in Japan are compounded by the changes in employment, where 'part-timers, temps or contract workers now account for nearly 40 percent of the workforce compared to about 20 percent in the 1980s' (Sieg & Miyazaki, 2017, p. 2). The word *Kakusashakai*, or gap-widening society,

is to be found everywhere in print, television, and online. Although Japan has always had gaps between those who have and those who do not, these facts were never so prominent in the discourses of identity in Japan, nor discussed widely in the media. They have now come to the forefront and entered into not just the lexicon of media pundits, but into daily life and into the modern narratives of Japanese identity. This widening income gap is largely generational also, contributing to the idea that each successive generation of youth is in some ways a new class or new species of Japanese, much like the terms Generation X and Millennial are used. This widening gap follows through into reactions to traditional television programming and the representation of hierarchical social structures, compounding the technological move to individual mobile screens and the internet's ability to provide on-demand, interactive narratives.

In conclusion, it has often been said by television's critics that TV doesn't deliver products to viewers but that viewers themselves are the *real* product, one that TV delivers to its advertisers. As Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli (1986) stated in their seminal discussion of cultivation analysis, of television as a socialising agent:

television is the source of the most broadly shared images and messages in history . . . the repetitive pattern of television's mass-produced messages and images forms the mainstream of a common symbolic environment. (p. 4)

However, this 'common symbolic environment', the enduring gaze of the audience in Japan, seems to be under pressure, not catastrophic pressure yet, given that in 2021, 29.1% of the Japanese population are aged 65 or older (Jiji Press, 2021), and television is still a dominant force in their everyday lives. However, for the younger generations, as Hagedoorn et al (2021) state, "relevance and authenticity are more of a priority than conventional concepts such as 'quality'. The relationship between young people and television has changed" (Hagedoorn et al, p.87).

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Multiple Intelligence Strategies: Developing Reading Comprehension Skills Among Junior High School Learners

Floreibel C. Gultiano

Instructor, National Service Training Program, Bukidnon State University, Philippines

Abstract

Multiple Intelligences has become an essential aspect of creating a difference in the levels of reading comprehension. This was anchored on the theory of Howard Gardner on his Multiple Intelligence which examined its effectiveness in the improvement of reading comprehension skills of the learners. This investigated the following: Profiles of the respondents in terms of: gender, age, parent's occupation and, reading materials available at home; Specific intelligences most of the respondents' exhibit; Reading comprehension proficiency level of the learners before and after the intervention; Significant difference in reading comprehension skills before and after the intervention; and Enhanced Multiple Intelligences intervention strategies to improve the reading comprehension skills. This study used the pretest- posttest design with descriptive qualitative and quantitative data gathering procedure to 293 Grade 9 Junior High School students from Bukidnon National High School.

Findings reveal that most of the respondents exhibit musical, bodily kinesthetic and verbal linguistic intelligences. The reading comprehension proficiency level of the respondents during the conduct of the pretest belongs to frustration level. After the intervention, most of the reading skills were on the independent level. It obviously denotes that with the teachers have a vital role in the selection of the activities in improving the reading level proficiency of the students. Careful planning and determining the weaknesses of the learners will help develop the learner's capacity to do more and increase their reading level proficiency. Thus, the use of MI strategies helped the learner in the improvement of their reading level proficiency.

Keywords: Multiple Intelligence, Reading Proficiency, Intervention, Reading Comprehension Skills

Introduction

Multiple Intelligences has become an essential aspect of creating a difference in the levels of reading comprehension. According to Shearer (2006), differentiated instruction for struggling readers often involves the use of reading materials in which they have "high interest". MI-inspired instruction, however, goes beyond mere "interests" in an attempt to activate alternative, perhaps stronger thinking skills. The way of teaching reading is very important. Students should be offered opportunities to understand the learning process and taught the MI theory so that they can effectively choose techniques by which to learn. furthermore, Tabrizi 2016, postulated that teachers can design activities and projects around the intelligences and allow their students to choose their learning activities based on their strengths.

Reading comprehension is one of the biggest problems that most schools in both grade school and high school are experiencing. Students who lack comprehension skills tend to get low marks in their language subject. this was mentioned in one of the reports of Philippine Star in March 2, 2010 that DepEd has an increase of 21.36 percent in NAT results from 2006 to 2009. The 2009 NAT discovered an escalation in Mean Percentage Score (MPS) of only 66.33 percent from 54.66 percent in 2006, which equates to an enhancement of 11.67%. The percentage gains were in all subject areas and pointed to a steady improvement in the primary education of the country's public-school system. So, what does this progress say about the reading skills of the country's students? It certainly speaks of a forward movement but a 66.33 MPS (from 54.66 in 2006) is still a rather low score, which, in fact, is only at the "near mastery level." What's more alarming is mastery is only at 14.4% among grade 6 students and

1.1% with 4th year high school students, which means below mastery scores are a staggering 85.6% among the former and 98.1% among the latter.

In the Philippine Informal Reading Inventory conducted, among the Grade 9 learners, there were 343 male learners who belong to the frustration level among the 584 male learners and 305 female learners out of 605. There are three reading levels according to Phil IRI. The Independent level with score range of 90 to 100 percent, Instructional level with score range of 75 to 89 percent and the Frustration level with score range of 0 to 74 percent. Thus, Luz (2007) said: Philippines, as a nation of non-readers. Centered on the population of 80 million, 6.6 percent illiteracy translates into 5.3 million Filipinos who cannot read or write; a number that grew by about 1.6 million over the past decade.

In response to these problems, DepEd Memo no. 244, s. 211 ordered and initiated various reading intervention programs. These are the Drop Everything and Read (DEAR), One Word a Day (AWAD) or Five Words a Week (FWAW); the Read- A- Thon and the Big Brother, Big Sister.

Framework

This study is anchored on the theory of Howard Gardner (1993) on Multiple Intelligences. Likewise, it is supported by Lev Vygotsky's sociocultural theory and his concept of the *zone of proximal development* (ZPD) and Carol Ann Tomlinson's Theory of Differentiated Instruction.

One theory that supports this study is Lev Vygotsky's sociocultural theory and his concept of the *zone of proximal development* (ZPD). Vygotsky defined scaffolding instruction as the role of teachers and others in supporting the learner's development and providing support structures to get to that next stage or level. An important aspect of scaffolding instruction is that the scaffolds are temporary. As the learner's abilities increase the scaffolding provided by the more knowledgeable other is progressively withdrawn. Finally, the learner can complete the task or master the concepts independently. Furthermore, Raymond (2000) postulated that the goal of the educator when using the scaffolding teaching strategy is for the student to become an independent and self-regulating learner and problem solver.

Teachers activate this zone when they teach students concepts that are just above their current skills and knowledge level, which motivates them to excel beyond their current skills level. Students are guided and supported through learning activities that serve as interactive bridges to get them to the next level. Thus, the learner develops new understandings by elaborating on their prior knowledge through the support provided by more capable others.

The concept of Lev Vygotsky's *zone of proximal development* (ZPD) will eventually help the learners as they escalate their concepts on the text that they will be reading. When learners have good prior knowledge, they can read independently.

Wherefore, developing reading comprehension skills among learners can be varied according to the special needs of the students. This is where the study anchored on. The theories of Howard Gardner on Multiple Intelligence vary directly to the Differentiated Instructions of Carol Ann Tomlinson in the main target of this study.

The Multiple Intelligence strategies were employed after determining the reading level of the students. The reading level was the main basis for the intervention using the Multiple Intelligence strategies. The students' type of intelligence was also tested through the MI. The results become the reference for the type of activities to be prepared. Subsequently, after the conduct of the activities, the students will be able to improve their reading proficiency.

Methodology

This study used the experimental design with descriptive qualitative and quantitative data gathering and procedure.

There were 293 respondents. The reading proficiency of the respondents was based on the reading inventory conducted at the start of the school year. Furthermore, the Multiple Intelligence Index Test had been taken by the students to determine which intelligence they belong and was also administered to determine the types of intelligence of the respondents. Purposive sampling was used to hopefully improve the reading comprehension of the students belonging to the researcher's classes. The margin of error used in the sampling and computation of t- test was within the level of significance of .05.

The researcher also used the Phil. IRI results conducted at the start of the school year to determine the reading proficiency of the respondents.

A 40-item Multiple Intelligence Index standardized classification test divided into 5 questions from the Child-Friendly Seminar conducted by the Division of Bukidnon was administered at the start of the school year to classify the students' Multiple Intelligences. The researcher planned the type of activities that would enhance the reading comprehension skills of the learners.

If results show that the strength falls on the Verbal Linguistic and the weaknesses is Bodily Kinesthetic, the teacher can give these types of student activities e.g., poem writing, reporting, or even writing speech. This type of student loves to read and write rather than to dance or be involved in sports activities. After answering this test, the students were grouped according to their intelligences.

A 50-item validated reading comprehension pretest was also conducted to check the reading proficiency among students. The same test was given in the post-test to test the significant difference. The test was piloted for a reliability testing. The scores from the post-test has been compared to pretest to check if there is significant difference with the students' scores after using MI related strategies in reading. The responses of the students have been recorded in a table form. The reading comprehension test was conducted as a pretest and post-test. The scoring procedure used to determine the level of reading comprehension was based on the Philippine Informal Reading Inventory. The scores are obtained through the succeeding scores.

For obtaining the reading proficiency, the students read a validated material with 50- item comprehension test which determined the reading level of the student. The reading levels are Independent, Instructional, and Frustration. The students' reading comprehension proficiency level was determined through summative evaluation which catered making inference, predicting outcomes, sequencing events, theme analysis, characterization, and cause- effect relationship. The data were gathered through recorded class activities, interviews and recorded pretest and post-test. The absence of performance characteristics gives impartial grading, comparisons, and evaluation of instructional effectiveness. On the other hand, paper/pencil tests such as multiple-choice formats can provide teachers with an objective and quick way to assess a student's achievement of content.

The researcher conducted the activity using three reading materials with MI based activities for one grading period which is equivalent to six weeks. The researcher used rubrics for each of the activities done by the students. The use of rubrics is already a mandate of the Department of Education based on the standardized Grading System for K- 12 as stipulated in DepEd order number 8 series of 2015. The grading system is also based on performance and for the English subject, 50% of the grade is performance. The activities set for each group of the students are based on the results of the Multiple Index Test conducted. If students have Bodily Kinesthetic intelligence, they might present a tableau or for a musical group, a rap presentation of a poem. Each performance is rated with a rubric. The teacher also recorded each activity. After each presentation, the teacher gave them the feedback for their presentations.

After six weeks, a post-test was conducted to determine the significant difference. A T-test treatment was then used to identify the significant difference.

Results and Discussions

Students Profile

Table 1 shows the profiles of the 293 respondents regarding their gender, age, parents' occupation and reading materials available at home. To identify the quantity of reading materials, the researcher had assigned number to the reading materials.

Table 1. Distribution of the Respondents according to Profile

Area	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Male	146	49.83%
Female	147	50.17%
Total	293	100
Ages		
12- 14	74	25%

15-17	212	72%
18 up	7	3%
Total	293	100
Parent's Occupation		
Professional	63	21.5%
Blue Collar Jobs	230	78.5%
Total	293	100
Reading Materials Available at Home		
Magazines/Newspapers/Comics	127	43.34%
Books/ Pocketbooks/Encyclopedia	161	54.9%
Others: Internet Access	5	1.71%
Total	293	100

The table shows that there are more female respondents of 147 than the males with 146. This is in contrast with the way it is perceived that there are more female population than that of male because according to <http://countrymeters.info/en/Philippines> (2017), there are 51.8M male population

Table 1 also reveals that most of respondents are ages 15- 17 years old which is 72% of the total population, followed by ages 12-14 years old respondents which is 25% of the population and 3% for 18 years old and above. Ages 15- 17 is the ideal age for Grade 9 students. In terms of the parents' occupation, 78.5% belongs to the blue-collar jobs- such as carpenter, laborer, factory workers, street sweepers, masonry, utility, farmers and others. This is of no surprise since in the area where the school is situated, there are factories for banana and pineapple plantation, piggery and poultry farms while there is only 21.5% of the parents belongs to the professional jobs like teachers, military services, medical practitioners, engineers and others, considering that this is a government owned school where it offers free education.

In terms of reading materials, most of the respondents (54.9%) confirmed that the materials present in their homes are books. During the interview, the respondents said that these books also include their textbooks and the pocketbooks which most of the teenagers love to read. Next in rank are the presence of magazine and comics which is 43.34% and only 1.71% has an internet access which would mean that getting access to the internet is not a necessity for these types of students rather they depend their readings on books as most of them have. This suggests that parents who have blue-collar jobs might not consider buying books and other reading materials for their children. This might be due to the reason that they allot more budget for basic necessities.

Specific Intelligences Exhibited by the Students

Table 2 presents the results of the Multiple Intelligence test index conducted to 293 respondents. Based on the results, the highest percentage of students comes from the musical intelligence with 27.26%. It is followed by the bodily kinesthetic with 14.33 %, then verbal linguistics with 13.65%. Both logical mathematical and intrapersonal intelligences follow with 11.26 %. The lowest in rank is the interpersonal intelligence with 4.78%.

These results show that most of the learners enjoy music and playing musical instruments. Thus, during the conduct of the activities, the learners were very enthusiastic in their presentations with the rap, and jazz chants. Based on an informal interview with these students, they learn more through music. Some also study while listening to music.

Table 2: Multiple Intelligence Index Results

INTELLIGENCE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
VERBAL LINGUISTICS	40	13.65 %
LOGICAL MATHEMATICAL	33	11.26 %
VISUAL/ SPATIAL	20	6.83 %
BODILY KINESTHETICS	42	14.33 %
MUSICAL	81	27.65 %

INTRAPERSONAL	33	11.26 %
INTERPERSONAL	14	4.78 %
NATURALISTIC	30	10.24 %
Total	293	100 %

The results of this study corroborate with the claim of The National Association for Music Education (2016) that students learn to improve their work, shows mastery in memorization and can develop creative thinking through music.

On the other hand, the bodily kinesthetic intelligence refers to the ability to use their body language to interpret songs or words. Thus, music and dance complement each other. These persons learn best through a hands-on approach, actively exploring the physical world around them. They may find it hard to sit still for long periods and may become distracted by their need for activity and exploration. With this type of intelligence, it is best to give the learners the activities where they move a lot. Such activities are tableau dance interpretation or even a role play. They learn more when they have to move their body and exhibit the *ability to control body movements and handle objects skillfully*.

Students with logical/mathematical intelligence have the ability to use reason, logic and numbers. Their skills include problem solving, classifying and categorizing information, working with abstract concepts to figure out the relationship of each to the other, handling long chains of reason to make local progressions, doing controlled experiments, questioning and wondering about natural events, performing complex mathematical calculations, working with geometric shapes while verbal linguistic intelligence shows ability to understand words. Consequently, there are really students who love to explain the lesson using what they have understood in the text. There are those who prefer to discuss the lessons because they are not given the gift of music and dance. The verbal linguistic learners could explain the piece well using the PowerPoint presentations and could create a wonderful piece for jazz chants.

The intrapersonal intelligence refers to the ability to self-reflect and be aware of one's inner state of being. Their skills include recognizing their own strengths and weaknesses, reflecting and analyzing themselves, awareness of their feelings, desires and dreams, evaluating their thinking patterns, reasoning with themselves, understanding their role in relationship to others.

It could not be denied that few of the students are just staying in the four corners of the classroom. Some of them would never recite and perform in class because they feel shy so some would prefer to write journals. They are the students who stay quiet in class while there is film viewing done in the class because they would try to understand every situation of the film. These types of learners learn more when they are alone.

The data was also reinforced by Slavin (2009) that MI theory of Gardner (1993) can be applied to the development of instructional techniques as well. A teacher can provide multiple entry points to the study of a topic by using different media, for example, and then encouraging students to express their understanding of the topic through diverse representational methods, such as pictures, writings, three-dimensional models, or dramatizations. Such instructional approaches make it possible for students to find at least one way of learning that is attuned to their predispositions, and they therefore increase motivation and engagement in the learning process.

Reading Comprehension Proficiency Level before the Intervention

Table 3 presents the results of the reading comprehension test prior intervention. Unfortunately, among all the reading skills presented, **none** of them belong to the instructional and independent reading level.

Table 3: *Reading Comprehension Proficiency Level (Pretest)*

Reading Skills	Mean Percentage	Mean Score	Reading Comprehension Proficiency Level
SEQUENCING EVENTS	58.19	34.10	FRUSTRATION

CHARACTERIZATION	55.02	32.24	FRUSTRATION
INFERENCE	47.88	28.06	FRUSTRATION
VOCABULARY	51.54	30.20	FRUSTRATION
SUPPORTING DETAILS	57.54	33.72	FRUSTRATION
DRAWING CONCLUSIONS	47.58	27.88	FRUSTRATION
NOTING DETAILS	54.56	31.98	FRUSTRATION
CAUSE AND EFFECT	44.94	26.33	FRUSTRATION
ANALYSIS	58.02	34.00	FRUSTRATION
VISUALIZATION	43.80	25.67	FRUSTRATION
IMPORTANT FACTS	63.40	37.15	FRUSTRATION

Consequently, the results show that all the skills obtained belong to the frustration level.

Moreover, this means that even if it is either lower item test or higher, there are a lot of students who belong to the frustration level. Furthermore, the results of the pretest show that these learners do not have yet prior knowledge of the stories that they are going to take and thus, students answered by guessing.

This scenario contradicts what Keene and Zimmermann (1997) and Miller (2002) in Pardo (2004) stated that background knowledge is an important factor for creating meaning, and teachers should help students activate prior knowledge before reading so that information connected with concepts or topics in the text is easily comprehensible during reading. If students do not have adequate background knowledge, teachers can help students build the appropriate knowledge.

Reading Comprehension Proficiency Level after the Intervention

Table 4 presents the results of the reading comprehension test after the intervention has been conducted. The table shows that there is an increase of the level of reading proficiency among the learners. The reading skills: sequencing events, characterization, vocabulary, supporting details, and analysis are already at the independent level in contrast to frustration level during the pretest.

Table 4: *Reading Comprehension Proficiency Level (Posttest)*

Reading Skills	Mean Percentage	Mean Score	Reading Comprehension Proficiency Level
SEQUENCING EVENTS	84.47	49.50	INDEPENDENT
CHARACTERIZATION	82.25	48.20	INDEPENDENT
INFERENCE	66.02	38.69	INSTRUCTIONAL
VOCABULARY	81.91	48.00	INDEPENDENT
SUPPORTING DETAILS	82.32	48.24	INDEPENDENT
DRAWING CONCLUSIONS	67.37	39.48	INSTRUCTIONAL
NOTING DETAILS	73.29	42.95	INSTRUCTIONAL
CAUSE AND EFFECT	60.41	35.40	FRUSTRATION
ANALYSIS	83.70	49.05	INDEPENDENT
VISUALIZATION	60.18	35.27	FRUSTRATION
IMPORTANT FACTS	90.19	42.28	INSTRUCTIONAL

On the other hand, inference, drawing conclusions, noting details, and identifying important facts belong to the instructional level. Even though, cause and effect and visualization are still at frustration level, the mean score increases. This shows that the use of Multiple Intelligences strategies made a difference on the reading comprehension proficiency level of the learners.

Outcome of the Intervention

Table 5 shows the results of the intervention. The respondents took the 50-item validated Reading Comprehension test, as used in the Philippine Informal Reading Inventory, as the pretest to identify their reading comprehension proficiency level. The result of the pretest as shown in table is very low. The mean score for the conducted pretest was **26.577**. This pretest result has clearly implied that learners do not have the right background yet of the stories.

Table 5: Computed Mean and T Value of Pretest and Post-test

	Total Respondents	Mean	StDev	SE Mean	T-Value	P-Value	Interpretation
PRE-TEST	293	26.577	7.407	0.433	-27.93	0	Significant
POST TEST	293	37.372	5.923	0.346			
Difference	293	10.795	6.616	0.387			

On the other hand, as the pretest results are compared to the post test results, a significant difference is shown. The post-tests mean percentage is **37.372**. The increase of pretest over post-test is 10.795. This clearly shows that the MI strategies used have shown a positive impact on the learning ability of the respondents.

The T- Value of -27.93 is lesser than the P value of 0. 0. Therefore, the test is significant and that there is a significant difference between the reading comprehension skills level before intervention and after intervention. It obviously denotes that the activities given had developed the reading comprehension skills of the students..

In the study conducted by Fuentes (2011) on “A Pilot Study of Applying Dynamic Strategies in Developing the Reading Comprehension of the Freshman Students in English” it has been said that the reading comprehension of the students can be developed if the dynamic strategies are applied in class. Thus, the problem on getting the students’ interest and developing their reading comprehension can be addressed if different strategies that do not settle on conventional way of teaching are applied. The study conducted by Ampong (2010) on “Differentiated Approach in Enhancing the Reading Proficiency Among Grade VI Pupils” postulated that pupils must hone their reading skills for their own sake because the learning of reading is an individual matter. However, to motivate the pupils in this endeavor, the teachers must play an active role. The findings about the effectiveness of differentiated approach in enhancing the reading proficiency level of the students were very revealing. In fact, within just four weeks of its implementation, there was already a marked increase of the pupil’s reading skills. The findings proved that the choice of teaching strategies really matter and that before using a strategy the learner should be given the first consideration. Baumann (1984) as cited by Borres (1999) had discussed that when teachers are actively, intensively, and systematically involved with instruction in reading comprehension, students learn to comprehend better than when instruction is incidental, undirected, or nonexistent.

Conclusion and Implication

Thus, the use of Multiple Intelligence Strategies among the Junior High School students could enhance their reading comprehension proficiency level. Learners were eager to learn more because the activities given to them are based on their intelligences.

Teachers should bear in mind that it is very important to plan appropriate activities for the students. Using the Multiple Intelligences strategies in class is a very good way to help the students in understanding a reading text. Discovering the intelligences of the learners also proves to be a worthwhile undertaking for teachers since not only can they apply the appropriate teaching strategies but can also get to know their students better. It is important that teachers know the skills of the students so that they can hone well the talents and abilities of the learners making them learn more since they are given equal opportunities to learn based on their specific intelligences.

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